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Burdens of Persuasion in Civil Cases:
Algorithms v. Explanations
Ronald Jay Allen and Sarah Lively
Abstract
The conjunction paradox has fascinated generations of scholars, primarily be-
cause it brings into focus the apparent incompatibility of equally well accepted
conventions. On the one hand, trials should be structured to reduce the total num-
ber, or optimize the allocation, of errors. On the other hand, burdens of persuasion
are allocated to elements by the standard jury instruction rather than to a case as a
whole. Because an error in finding to be true any element of the plaintiff’s cause
of action will result in an error if liability is found, errors on the overall case accu-
mulate with errors on discrete issues. This, in turn, means that errors will neither
be minimized nor optimized (except possibly randomly). Thus, the conventional
view concerning the purpose of trial is inconsistent with the conventional view
concerning the allocation of burdens of persuasion. Two recent efforts to resolve
this conflict are examined in this article. Dean Saul Levmore has argued that the
paradox is eliminated or reduced considerably because of either the implications
of the Condorcet Jury Theorem or the implications of super majority voting rules.
Professor Alex Stein has constructed a micro-economic explanation of negligence
that is also offered as resolving the paradox. Neither succeed, and both fail for
analogous reasons. First, each makes a series of ad hoc adjustments to the sup-
posedly formal arguments that are out of place in formal reasoning. The result
is that neither argument is, in fact, formal; both arguments thus implicitly reject
the very formalisms they are supposedly employing in their explanations. Sec-
ond, both articles mismodel the system of litigation they are trying to explain in
an effort to close the gap between their supposedly formal models and the reality
of the legal system; and when necessary corrections are made to their respective
models of litigation, neither formal argument maps onto the reality of trials, leav-
ing the original problem untouched and unexplained. These two efforts are thus
very much similar to the failed effort to give a Bayesian explanation to trials and
juridical proof, which similarly failed due to the inability to align the formal re-
quirements of subjective Bayesianism with the reality of modern trials. We also
explore the reasons for this consistent misuse of formal arguments in the eviden-
tiary context. Rationality requires, at a minimum, sensitivity to the intellectual
tools brought to a task, of which algorithmic theoretical accounts are only one
of many. Another, somewhat neglected in legal scholarship, is substantive expla-
nations of legal questions that take into account the surrounding legal landscape.
As we show, although the theoretical efforts to domesticate the conjunction para-
dox fail, a substantive explanation of it can be given that demonstrates the small
likelihood of perverse consequences flowing from it. The article thus adds to the
growing literature concerning the nature of legal theorizing by demonstrating yet
another area where legal theorizing in one of its modern conventional manifesta-
tions (involving the search for the algorithmic argument that purportedly explains
or justifies an area of law) has been ineffectual, whereas explanations that are in-
formed by the substantive contours of the relevant legal field have considerable
promise.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Algorithms are wonderfully useful in efficiently resolving many complex problems 
(such as long division), may very well be critical to surviving in a hostile environment,1 
and consequently, a predilection for them may be hardwired into the human brain.  As 
one neuroscientist said about the search for patterns in complex data, “we’re showing . . . 
that basically, your brain is set up to look for that sort of structure . . . even if there were 
no structure there.”2  Whatever the value of such a search when successful, as Dr. 
Huettel’s comment implies, the search may come up empty.  And it may have deleterious 
consequences by generating an erroneous decision under an inappropriate algorithm and 
by wasting resources in the ill-advised search.3 
A considerable body of legal scholarship has been produced examining the utility of 
various algorithms for predicting, explaining, or prescribing the law, some useful and 
                                                     
∗ John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern University. 
∗∗ JD 2003, Northwestern University School of Law.  A draft of this paper was submitted by Ms. Lively in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Senior Research Program.  We are grateful to Craig Callen, 
Paul Edelman, David Haddock, Jeff Hirst, Larry Laudan, Richard Posner, Alex Stein, and the participants 
of the Northwestern Legal Theory Workshop and the MSU-DCL Law School Conference on Visions of 
Rationality in Evidence Law, for comments on a previous draft. 
1 If a child wanders down to the river and gets eaten by an alligator, survival of the family’s genes may be 
facilitated by inferring a rule from the observation. 
2 Quoted on CNN.com, 1-10-03; see also Scott A. Huettel, Peter B. Mack & Gregory McCarthy, 
Perceiving Patterns in Random Series: Dynamic Processing of Sequence in Prefrontal Cortex, 5 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE 485 (2002).   
3 For example, if the family whose child was eaten by an alligator only gets protein from the river it will 
have to develop some other alternative to its tragedy than “Don’t go down to the river.” 
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others less so.4  In the field of evidence, this phenomenon is most obvious in the very 
interesting work that has been done on the relationship between probability theory and 
the legal process.5  A significant portion of that work, in turn, has been driven by efforts 
to domesticate what are known as the proof paradoxes.6  The simplest example of the 
proof paradoxes emerges from the interrelationship between the conventional conception 
of trials as designed either to optimize fact finders’ utilities or the distribution of errors 
and the equally conventional instruction in civil cases that plaintiffs must prove each 
essential element to a preponderance of the evidence, which is understood to mean 
greater than a .5 probability. 
For either utilities or errors to be optimized, the probability of the conjunction of the 
elements that form liability must exceed .5, not the discrete elements themselves.  This 
can be seen easily with the help of a stylized example.  Suppose there are two elements to 
a cause of action, such as negligence and causation in a tort action.  If either is false, the 
defendant deserves to win.  If each is proven to a .6 probability, and if they are 
                                                     
4 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 
2003).  For an exploration into the limits of algorithms see Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal 
Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
683 (2002) [hereinafter Hedgehogs], and Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment 
and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149 
(1998). 
5 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. 
L. REV. 1329 (1971); Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977) [hereinafter 
Modeling Relevance]; Craig Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian Theory 
in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L.J. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Grand Illusion]; D.H. Kaye, Quantifying Probative 
Value, 66 B.U. L. REV. 761 (1986); D.H. Kaye, Clarifying the Burden of Persuasion: What Bayesian 
Decision Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 INT’L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 1 (1999); Ronald J. Allen, Clarifying 
the Burden of Persuasion and Bayesian Decision Rules: A Response to Professor Kaye, 4 INT’L J. OF 
EVIDENCE & PROOF 246 (2000). 
6 See generally L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977) (for a selection of critiques of L. 
Cohen’s general analysis, see Open Peer Commentary to L. Cohen, Can Human Irrationality be 
Experimentally Demonstrated, 4 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 317, 331 (1981)); see also Ronald J. 
Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401 (1986) [hereinafter Reconceptualization]; 




stochastically independent (a simplifying but not necessary assumption), the probability 
of both being true is .6 x .6 = .36.  That means in turn that there is a 1.0 - .36 = .64 
probability that at least one is false.  If the assessments of probability are accurate, then in 
a large set of similar cases, approximately 64% of the time, defendants will not have 
committed the acts necessary for liability, and returning verdicts for plaintiffs will result 
in correct results 36% of the time and incorrect results 64% of the time.  To generalize, 
returning a verdict for plaintiffs when it is more likely that defendants deserve to win will 
not optimize utilities or errors; one will expect to make, and probably will make, many 
more errors against deserving defendants than against deserving plaintiffs, and the 
expected number of total errors, and probably the actual number of errors, would be 
reduced by applying a different rule: to-wit that the fact finder should base its decision on 
the probability of the conjunction of all the necessary elements. 
So there seems to be a paradox here, and it has captured the attention of numerous 
scholars.  It prompted one distinguished philosopher to create an entirely new 
mathematics of induction in an effort to resolve the paradox,7 an effort that ultimately 
foundered on the apparently inescapable fact that errors accumulate as a function of 
errors on discrete elements in his system as they do within conventional probabilistic 
approaches.8  It has led another distinguished scholar essentially to give up explaining the 
paradox presumably on the ground that it will affect any logical approach to the 
problem.9 
                                                     
7 COHEN, supra note 6. 
8 See Reconceptualization, supra note 6, at 418-19. 
9 D.H. Kaye, Two Theories of the Civil Burden of Persuasion, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY AND RISK 1 (2003) 
(conjunction is “as much a problem for the equal-error theory as for the standard theory. . .”). 
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Nonetheless, academics have not been deterred.  Recently two distinguished scholars 
have attempted to explain away the proof paradoxes.  Saul Levmore thinks the answer 
lies in either the Condorcet Jury Theorem or in the implications of supermajority 
voting.10  Alex Stein thinks the answer emerges from uncovering the economic 
implications of trials.11  While both articles are rich and interesting for various reasons, 
neither provides a satisfactory theoretical account of the proof paradoxes, and for similar 
reasons.  First, both make a series of ad hoc adjustments to their own arguments that are 
out of place in formal reasoning, again undermining the attempt to employ algorithms to 
explain the phenomenon under examination.  Second, both articles mismodel the system 
of litigation they are trying to explain; and when necessary corrections are made to the 
model, neither of their formal arguments maps onto the reality of trials, leaving the 
original problem untouched and unexplained.     
We explore these issues in this article.  We begin with a brief examination of whether 
there is a proof paradox to explain.  A number of scholars have asserted that perhaps 
there is not, and Levmore takes an ambiguous position on the question.  As we show in 
Part II, there is no ambiguity about the law, and the law as conventionally understood 
involves an apparent paradox.  In Parts III and IV, we demonstrate that Levmore’s and 
Stein’s explanations do not resolve the paradox.  While we think that the proof paradoxes 
may not be explained away in the manner that Levmore and Stein attempt to do so, we do 
think they can be explained and part of that explanation is why the paradoxes are not 
pernicious.  In Part V we provide that explanation.  That explanation, in turn, may be 
                                                     
10 Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 723 (2001). 
11 Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs That Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and Their 
Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1199 (2001). 
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evidence that the common impulse among legal academics to search for the theory or 
algorithm that explains some slice of the legal landscape may be unavailing in some 
instances, and that instead knowledge more likely may be advanced by searching for and 
testing substantive explanations of complex phenomena that may not be reducible to 
relatively simple algorithmic form.   
The bearing of this inquiry on the general topic of “visions of rationality” is plain.  
Rationality requires, at a minimum, sensitivity to the intellectual tools brought to a task, 
of which algorithmic theoretical accounts are only one of many.12  Another, somewhat 
neglected in legal scholarship, is substantive explanations of legal questions that take into 
account the surrounding legal landscape.  As we will show, the theoretical efforts to 
domesticate the conjunction paradox fail, but a substantive explanation of it can be given 
that demonstrates the small likelihood of perverse consequences flowing from it.  While 
we doubt that this demonstration will contribute directly to the survival of the species, we 
hope that it may contribute to a deeper understanding of legal phenomena. 
II. IS THERE A CONJUNCTION PROBLEM? 
Levmore notes that the legal practice appears at odds with probabilistic reasoning;13 
simple notions of probability require “multiplying the probabilities associated with 
several events or requirements” that comprise a legal claim in order to assess the 
likelihood of the truth of that claim, but “judges and lawyers seem otherwise inclined.”14  
Levmore also notes that “courts and statutes might be explicit about the manner in which 
                                                     
12 For an interesting discussion of similar issues from an epistemological perspective, see NICHOLAS 
RESCHER, COGNITIVE PRAGMATISM 3 (2001) (“. . . the principal message of the book is that in matter of 
inquiry and cognition the interrelationship or practical and theoretical issues is both more intimate and 
more complex than theorists of knowledge generally recognize.”). 
13 See Levmore, supra note 10, at 723. 
14 Id. 
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multiple requirements [of a legal claim] should be combined, but they are not.”15  Indeed, 
Levmore suggests that the legal system is “strangely ambiguous” in its instructions to 
juries on whether they must evaluate a claim based upon the probability of each element 
of the claim, or upon the conjunction of the elements of such a claim.16  Levmore implies 
that the answer may depend upon the way in which a jury views its “ambiguous” 
instruction, and cites to the work of Dale Nance to that effect.17  Levmore also reviews 
case reports in the Jury Verdict Weekly that he believes may possibly reflect this 
ambiguity.  Still, in the end, he concludes that the paradox is probably real, and he 
proceeds on that basis.  
Levmore’s acceptance of the formal paradox is well taken.  Essentially none of the 
material he or Nance cites to is plausibly ambiguous; and even if that is erroneous, only a 
little uncovering of related material eliminates any possible ambiguity.  For example, to 
illustrate his point that at least some states are ambiguous in their treatment of the 
conjunction issue, Levmore cites to a Florida standard jury instruction, which reads: 
The issues for your determination on the claim of (claimant) against 
(defendant) are: whether defendant was negligent in (describe negligence); 
and, if so whether such negligence was a legal cause of injury sustained by 
(claimant).  If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the 
claim of (claimant), then your verdict should be for defendant.18 
                                                     
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 See id. at n.1 (citing to Dale A. Nance, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical 
Interpretation of the Logic of Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 947 (1986) [hereinafter Supposed Paradoxes]).  
Others have uncritically accepted Nance’s argument without checking the data. See, e.g., Richard D. 
Friedman, “E” is for Eclectic: Multiple Perspectives on Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 2029, 2041 (commenting 
that Nance’s argument was persuasive).  Nance, by contrast, has been far more circumspect about his own 
work, referring to his “own modest search of authorities.” Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and 
the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1571 (2001) [hereinafter Naturalized 
Epistemology].  However, he does go on to say that “no significant legal research . . . has contradicted my 
conclusion.” Id. at 1572.  We present that contradicting data here. 
18 Levmore, supra note 10, at n.1 (citing to Florida Standard Jury Instructions: Civil, Negligence § 3.5 at 




Levmore suggests that this instruction is ambiguous, although he also thinks that Florida 
law “appears” to require proof of each element rather than the conjunction.19  In fact, 
there is no question under Florida law that this instruction merely defines the burden of 
persuasion and does not determine its extension.  In an unbroken line of cases, the Florida 
courts have consistently asserted that the proper standard in civil cases is that plaintiffs 
must prove each essential element of the claim.20  Indeed, the point is so obvious that the 
Florida courts have remarked, “No recitation of authority is necessary for the proposition 
that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
each element of his cause of action.”21  There is not a single case in Florida that we could 
find that speaks to proving the conjunction of the essential elements.  We agree that all 
language contains ambiguity, but there is not very much of it here. 
As Levmore indicates, Prof. Dale Nance has also noted possible ambiguity in jury 
instructions.22  Nance cites a federal pattern jury instruction to demonstrate his point:  
The burden is on the plaintiff in a civil action, such as this, to prove every 
essential element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.  If the 
proof should fail to establish any essential element of plaintiff’s claim by 
preponderance of the evidence in the case, the jury should find for the 
defendant.23  
 
                                                     
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., McNeill v. Pinellas County Sch. Bd., 678 So.2d 476, 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (court 
requires School Board to prove each element of the charged offense by a preponderance of the evidence); 
De Mandoza v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 221 So.2d 797, 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (Court states 
that plaintiff claiming personal injury “must prove each essential element of his claim in order to be entitled 
to a verdict.”).   
21 Greenfield Real Estate Inv. Corp. v. Merritt, 348 So.2d 1199, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (citing 
Sharp v. Long, 283 So.2d 567, 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)) (emphasis added). 
22 Levmore, supra note 10, at n.1.  In particular, Levmore cites to Reconceptualization, supra note 6, and 
Supposed Paradoxes, supra note 17, to demonstrate varying viewpoints on the law’s ambiguity and on the 
correct approach to multiple element claims. 
23 Supposed Paradoxes, supra note 17, at 949 (citing E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE 
AND INSTRUCTIONS § 71.14 (3d ed. 1977)). 
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Nance notes the ambiguity presented in the phrase “every essential element of his claim” 
in that “every” might mean “all” or it might mean “each.”24  Consequently, Nance 
suggests that we ought to “consider such instructions skeptically, at least when 
considering which underlying theory of probability they confirm.”25  
Certainly, “every” could mean “all” or “each,” but any ambiguity in the first sentence 
of the instruction is clarified by the second: “If the proof should fail to establish any 
essential element of plaintiff’s claim by preponderance of the evidence in the case, the 
jury should find for the defendant.”  Plainly, the phrase “any essential element,” (despite 
any ambiguity caused by the term “every” in the previous sentence), requires serial 
consideration of the elements against the standard of proof.  Still, Nance argues that the 
second sentence in the above instruction is consistent with the idea that a plaintiff’s 
claim, as a whole, must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence before the plaintiff 
can win his case,26 and suggests that perhaps the purpose of the second sentence is simply 
“to remind the jury that a failure by the plaintiff to sufficiently prove any element of the 
plaintiff’s case will relieve the jury of further deliberations on the other elements.”27   
Consistency is not very helpful in understanding the meaning of this language; 
requiring proof of each element is consistent with an infinite number of propositions that 
are themselves inconsistent with each other (such as the requirement that the probability 
of the conjunction of the elements be greater than, less than, or equal to the square root of 
.64, to pick a set at random).  More telling, the second sentence contains no indication 
that it does not mean just what it says.  There is literally no indication in this instruction 
                                                     
24 Id. 





that it is meant to single out any one of the infinite propositions with which it is 
consistent and bestow upon that proposition its imprimatur. 
At any rate, other instructions in the Devitt and Blackmar pattern jury set clarify the 
meaning of Nance’s general one.  For instance, an instruction concerning an action for 
fraud and deceit states: 
Plaintiff’s claim against the defendant has six essential elements, as 
follows: 
First, that the defendant represented to the plaintiff that (here set forth 
the alleged representation); 
Second, that the representation was false; 
Third, (that the representation was known by the defendant to be false 
when it was made) (that the defendant made the representation 
recklessly and without regard to its truth or falsity) (that defendant told 
the plaintiff that it had knowledge that the representation was true, 
while not having such knowledge); 
Fourth, that the plaintiff relied on the representation and was deceived 
by it; 
Fifth, that the plaintiff acted with ordinary prudence in relying on the 
representation; and 
Sixth, that the false representation was the proximate cause of injury to 
the plaintiff. 
If you find that the plaintiff has established each of these elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you should return a verdict for the 
plaintiff. . . .28 
 
In short, the Devitt and Blackmar instructions mandate proof of each essential element.  
So, too, do other federal pattern jury instructions.  For example, a recent version of the 
model federal jury instructions states:  
This is a civil case and as such the plaintiff has the burden of proving the 
material allegations of his complaint (e.g., by a fair preponderance of the 
evidence). . . .  If after considering all of the testimony you are satisfied 
                                                     
28 E. DEVITT, C. BLACKMAR & M. WOLF, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 83.02 (4th ed. 
1987). 
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that the plaintiff has carried his burden on each essential point as to 
which he has the burden of proof, then you must find for the plaintiff on 
his claims.29  
 
More important than simply the pattern jury instructions themselves, the federal courts 
actually use such instructions in practice, and thus purport to require serial consideration 
of elements in a claim.30 
The states are in accord with federal practice.  For example, in California, the Rules 
of Evidence state explicitly that the party who has the burden of proof has that burden “as 
to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or 
defense that he is asserting.”31  California case law accordingly requires that the “. . . 
jurors must concur that each element of a cause of action has been proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence” in order for a plaintiff to win.32  Similarly, Illinois Pattern 
Jury Instructions provide:  
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions:  
First, that the defendant acted or failed to act . . .; second, that [the plaintiff 
was injured] [and] [the plaintiff’s property was damaged]; third, that the 
                                                     
29 Modern Federal Jury Instructions: Civil, Burden of Proof § 73.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2002), 
available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, MOFJI File.   
30 Several federal courts have used and approved of this jury instruction or a similar instruction that 
requires proof of each element of a claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Peyton v. DiMario, 
287 F.3d 1121, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The jury returned a unanimous verdict finding that Peyton proved, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, each element of her claim of sex discrimination. . . .”); Wolf Creek 
Collieries v. OWCP, 298 F.3d 511, 520 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Claimants must prove each element by a 
preponderance of the evidence,” citing Adams v. OWCP, 886 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir.1989)); Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Pendleton Detectives of Miss., Inc., 182 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1999) (“To prove negligence, ‘a 
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence each element of negligence: duty, breach of duty, 
proximate causation, and injury,’” quoting Lovett v. Bradford, 676 So.2d 893, 896 (Miss. 1996)); Ressler v. 
White, 968 F.2d 1478, 1479 (2nd Cir. 1992) (per curium) (“[The Jury] instruction correctly stated that the 
plaintiffs had the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence each element of the claim. . . .”). 
31 CA. R. EVID. 500. 
32 Valentine v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252, 265 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Stoner 
v. Williams, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 243, 252 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)); see also Smith v. Santa Rosa Police 
Dept., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72, 89 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“ultimate burden of proof . . . rests with the 
plaintiff to prove each of the relevant facts supporting its cause of action”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552, n.25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“a plaintiff seeking summary judgment must prove each element of the cause of action. . . .”).  
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negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause [of the injury]. . . .  If 
you find from your considerations of all the evidence that each of these 
propositions has been proved, then your verdict should be for the 
plaintiff.33 
 
Finally, a Massachusetts jury instruction on the Burden of Proof states:  
This as you know has been the trial of a civil case.  We begin each civil 
case with the proposition that the plaintiff, the party who is seeking to 
recover damages from the other, has the burden of proving each essential 
element of his or her case by a fair preponderance of the evidence.34 
 
While we did not obtain every jury instruction from every state, we did not come across a 
single instruction that plausibly could be interpreted to require the finding of the 
conjunction of the elements rather than each element serially, leaving the conjunction 
paradox intact as a formal matter. 
                                                     
33 Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Burden of Proof – Negligence § 21.02 (West 2000). 
34 Massachusetts Jury Instructions, Civil, Burden of Proof § 1.14(D), LEXIS, Nexis Library, MACVJI File.  
Although ostensibly concluding that the conjunction paradox generally exists, and proceeding on that basis, 
Levmore cites to two further jury instructions that he thinks at least ambiguous about the matter. Levmore, 
supra note 10, at n.41.  The first instruction, a Michigan instruction, states: “The plaintiff has the burden of 
proof on each of the following propositions: a. that the plaintiff [was injured/sustained damage]; b. that the 
defendant was negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the plaintiff, as stated to you in these 
instructions; c. that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the [injuries/damages] to the 
plaintiff.” Mich. Std. Civ. Jury Instructions § 16.02 (1988) (emphasis added).  The phrase “on each of the 
following propositions” seems to us not ambiguous at all, as it clearly requires serial consideration of the 
elements of the claim.  The Michigan judiciary agrees, see Kelly v. Builders Square, Inc., 632 N.W.2d 912, 
918 (Mich. 2001) (“Plaintiff had the burden to prove each element of her case.”) (emphasis added). 
Levmore also cites to a New Hampshire instruction: “The plaintiff claims: [State essential elements of 
the claim, making reference to time, place and circumstances] . . .  These are the issues which are to be 
determined by you based on the facts as you find them to be and by applying the law as the court instructs 
you.” Levmore, supra note 10, at n.41 (citing N.H. Civ. Jury Instructions § 1.1 (1999)).  This was the one 
jurisdiction that any skeptic about the existence of the formal conjunction paradox has raised in which we 
could not definitely establish its presence.  New Hampshire seems to be an anomaly as its courts apparently 
have no preference on whether juries ought to be instructed that a plaintiff has the burden of proof on “all” 
versus “each” of the elements. See Sayers v. Ralston Tree Serv., Inc., 189 A.2d 480, 488 (N.H. 1963) (“The 
argument that the Trial Court erred in its instruction to the effect that the jury must find that the plaintiff 
had proved ‘all of the elements’ . . . instead of charging that the jury must find that he had proved ‘each 
element’ . . ., requires no discussion.”).  It seems that the New Hampshire courts equate the term “all” with 
“each” or vice versa.  As long as the “instructions given embody the law applicable to the case,” Brown v. 
Gottesman, 165 A.2d 43, 46 (N.H. 1960), New Hampshire courts have, apparently, little else to say about 
the burden of persuasion. 
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But, perhaps the facts on the ground differ from the formal requirements of the law.  
Although he ultimately rejects the idea, Levmore raises the possibility that perhaps most 
cases really do involve single formal elements.35  After reviewing a random sample of 
jury verdicts in Jury Verdicts Weekly, he concluded that 20% of the cases involved one 
issue,36 30% involved “two or more independent, contested elements,” and in the 
remaining 50%, it was not clear whether the jury was deciding “one issue or more.”37 
We reviewed the same Jury Verdicts Weekly and examined every case in the 
summary published from January to March of 1996, which is the period from which 
Levmore took his random sample.  Examining every case result clarifies that multiple 
formal elements are typically litigated.38  At the very most, only 8% of the total number 
of cases reported (including those that were settled) could possibly have involved single 
issues.39  We counted single issue cases as those which, in their story-like descriptions, 
contained phrases (in bold print) such as, “negligence admitted,” which suggests that 
causation was the only contested element.  However, it is not clear that even these “bold 
print” cases literally involved single issues as some cases imply that damages were 
contested.40  While in general the rest of the case summaries did not list or make easily 
                                                     
35 Levmore, supra note 10, at 746-48. 
36 Id. (discussing Jury Verdict’s Weekly (Jan.-Mar. 1996)). 
37 Id. 
38 See id. To say that elements are litigated is merely to say they are not conceded.  The actual factual 
dispute at trial may be over a very small range of evidence or facts but still range over multiple formal 
elements. See infra, Part V. 
39 See Jury Verdict’s Weekly (Jan.-Mar. 1996). 
40 Id.  In most, if not all of these bold print cases, damages were also disputed.  In any event, these bold 
print cases were counted as single issue cases along with any other case (not bearing bold print) that could 
possibly be identified as presenting only one issue to the jury.  The resultant number was 40 single issue 
cases, which is approximately 8% of the total number of cases.  
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identifiable the precise number of elements involved in each specific claim,41 they 
provided descriptions of the cases, such as the following: 
1) Auto Collision: “Plaintiff contended that she was on a dark stretch of the 
highway with two vehicles boxing her in; that the lead car slammed on its brakes . 
. . defendant was at fault in rear-ending plaintiff’s vehicle.42  
 
2) Wrongful Termination: “Plaintiff contended that defendant breached the 
implied contract of employment by eliminating his position due to his age and 
physical handicap.”43  
 
Plainly, these summaries describe legal claims that involve more than one element, and 
there is no indication (via bold print or anything else) in the case descriptions that 
anything went uncontested.  Consequently, as Levmore in the end concludes, the number 
of single-issue cases is apparently quite small, and conjunction remains problematic.44 
III. THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM, SUPERMAJORITY VOTING 
RULES, AND THE CONJUCTION PROBLEM 
Levmore identifies “an interesting connection between our practices with respect to 
aggregation and conjunction”45 that may provide a way out of the thicket of the apparent 
paradoxes.  His article is wide ranging, but our concern is with only one aspect of it, 
although it is an important aspect.  In particular, he “advances the idea that the process of 
aggregating multiple jurors’ assessments hides valuable information.”46  Levmore first 
argues that because “the Condorcet Jury Theorem indicates that agreement among 
multiple jurors might raise our level of confidence in a particular determination beyond 
what the jurors themselves individually report,”47 it may help to explain the law’s 
                                                     
41 See id. 
42 Id. at Jan. 26, 1996, Elias v. Ryan. 
43 Id. at Feb. 23, 1996, Perry v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. 
44 In Part V, we explain why quite likely conjunction is not perverse. 
45 Levmore, supra note 10, at 734.  
46 Id. at 723.   
47 Id. at 723-24.     
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“disinclination to instruct factfinders according to [the] basic rule of probability.”48  He 
next argues that supermajority voting rules may not only complement the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem (“CJT”), but perhaps further explain why the law’s suppression of the product 
rule is not as problematic as it seems.49  As we develop in this section, neither the CJT 
nor supermajority voting rules can explain the law’s disinclination toward applying the 
product rule, and thus, the conjunction problem, despite Levmore’s efforts, remains.  In 
addition, Levmore’s argument neglects that many trials are bench trials before single 




                                                     
48 Id. at 737.  As Paul H. Edelman has pointed out, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 347 (2002), one must specify a probability model in order to interpret the 
truth of jury results under the Condorcet Theorem.  Although Levmore does not specify his model, he 
obviously employs an aggregation of information model (that permits statements to be made about the truth 
of legal fact findings), rather than a “randomness” or “polling” model.  The randomness model is plainly 
inappropriate in a jury setting, but Edelman concludes that the polling model, rather than the aggregation of 
information model employed by Levmore, is the more accurate description of jury decision making. Id. at 
347.  The polling model describes juries as bodies of randomly chosen members whose majority vote “will 
approach with probability 1 the result of a majority vote among all possible voters,” id. at 332, and “does 
not depend on any particular knowledge of the jury,” id. at 347.  Edelman makes a persuasive case, which 
if accepted, as he develops in detail, demonstrates that Levmore’s arguments are in error.  Nonetheless, 
Levmore is not making claims about legal decision makers accurately deciding what the population at large 
would decide; he is making claims about the truth of the facts found by legal decision makers, and we are 
working within that constraint. 
Edelman rejects the “aggregation of prior information” model on the ground that it is not “reasonable 
to view a juror as an expert who has some a priori information about the issues at hand,” and that it “strains 
credulity” “to think of [jurors] as ‘experts’ with a prior track record on evaluating legal matters.” Id. at 346.  
Edelman is thinking here of a panel of medical experts called to issue an opinion about some matter within 
their expertise, and surely jurors do not look like that.  However, there is a sense in which juries are 
inference machines that do entail a form of aggregation of prior information.  In particular, the knowledge 
and experience of the individual jurors is necessary to evaluating, explaining, and understanding the 
evidence, and is brought to the surface through both individual assessments of evidence and deliberation 
with other jurors. See Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604 
(1994) [hereinafter Factual Ambiguity].  Although some reference to jurors’ background knowledge is 
required to make sense of juridical evidence, nonetheless, as discussed in Factual Ambiguity, supra, at 627-
29, the rules of evidence intrude to reduce the extent to which one could accurately analogize a lay jury to a 
group of experts.  In any event, as we demonstrate in the remainder of this article, no matter what model is 
adopted, the Condorcet Jury Theorem simply does not map onto the structure of modern day juries. 
49 Levmore, supra note 10, at 739-45. 
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A. The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Conjunction 
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem50 proves that if the probable truth of an enlightened voter’s 
opinion is greater than one-half when choosing between one of two alternatives, then the 
larger the group of such voters, the greater the probability that a majority decision will be 
“true.”51  Levmore derives from the CJT the following argument: 
If every juror reacts to evidence of defendant’s negligence with an 
individual assessment that this is .6 likely, it seems plausible if not certain 
that this jury would report a unanimous .6 assessment (if asked for a 
number).  But we would know (by the way of the Jury Theorem) that these 
well-meaning jurors failed to appreciate the combined power of their 
assessments.  Had we asked each whether the assessment of negligence 
should be .6 or more, all would have responded affirmatively, and it is 
reasonable to think that every juror is more likely than not to get this 
question right.  If each juror thinks that .6 is a good assessment of the first 
requirement, and .7 is a good assessment of the second, the large jury’s 
overall chance of being right, as to the questions of negligence (or not) and 
causation (or not), may be quite high with respect to each question.  The 
product rule is still correct, to be sure, but the product rule yields a number 
almost surely closer to 1.0 than to .42.52 
 
                                                     
50 The Condorcet Jury Theorem (“CJT”) was promulgated by the Marquis de Condorcet in 1785 in his 
Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probailité des decisions rendues à la pluralité de voix [hereinafter 
Essai] translated in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 33 (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976) [hereinafter 
SELECTED WRITINGS].  Although the theory originally focused upon jury decisions involving the death 
penalty, Condorcet soon turned his attention toward decisions made by political assemblies. Cheryl D. 
Block, Truth and Probability – Ironies in the Evolution of Social Choice Theory, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 975, 
1003 (1998).  The Essai embodies Condorcet’s attempt to combine mathematics with the social sciences, to 
investigate the logic of public participation in politics (after the French Revolution), and to lay the 
mathematical groundwork for a system of representative institutions that could guarantee “truth” in 
decision-making. Keith Michael Baker, CONDORCET: FROM NATURAL PHILOSOPHY TO SOCIAL 
MATHEMATICS 228-29 (The Univ. of Chicago 1975) [hereinafter CONDORCET].  The purpose of 
Condorcet’s Essai was to apply mathematical reasoning to what he saw as the “problem of political 
obligation in the context of representative institutions.” Id. at 229.  Condorcet was concerned with 
subjecting represented citizens to laws that were not unanimously voted upon, or to decisions that were 
against their individual interests. Id.  Thus, the thrust of Condorcet’s Essai was to determine the conditions 
under which the probability of the truth of a majority decision, (made by an assembly or a tribunal), would 
be high enough to justify compulsory acceptance of that decision by the rest of society. Id. at 228. 
51 CONDORCET, supra note 50, at 236.  It is important to note that, for purposes of this discussion, “true” 
should be interpreted as “correct.”  However, for Condorcet, “true” did not exactly mean “correct,” as he 
believed that all truth was a matter of probability and that there was never any absolute certainty in 
decision-making. Id. at 237.  Thus, he defined a “true” decision simply as one made by a truly enlightened 
man. Id.  
52 Levmore, supra note 10, at 736. 
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This argument is inconsistent with the assumptions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, and 
is, thus, formally flawed.  Moreover, the argument fails to account for the reality of jury 
trials in various ways. 
1. Failing to Account for the Essential Assumptions of the CJT  
Under the version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem employed by Levmore, each of the 
following conditions must be met in order for the Theorem to operate successfully: 
(1) Groups must be made up of equally enlightened voters each bearing a 
probability of greater than one-half of reaching a true decision;53 
(2)  Group members must express their opinions in good faith;54 
(3) Group members must not “influence” one another’s decision;55 
                                                     
53 Essai, supra note 50, at 48-49; see also CONDORCET, supra note 50, at 235-36.  If the probable truth of 
each voter’s opinion is less than one-half (which should only happen in situations where a voter’s prejudice 
or self-interest affects his judgment), the majority decision of such a group will most likely be erroneous. 
Essai, supra note 50, at 49 (the probability of an erroneous decision increases as the number of persons in 
such a group increases).  Where the probable truth of each voter’s opinion is merely one-half, the truth of 
the majority decision of such voters is also one-half. Id. (such is the case no matter what the number of 
individuals voting).   
Condorcet only addresses the case in which the probable truth of each voter’s opinion is exactly the 
same; he does not apply his Theorem to heterogeneous groups. See generally id.  However, the CJT may 
still operate when a voting group is comprised of individuals whose probable truth of opinion vary, as long 
as the group is sufficiently large and the “average competence” of the group is “greater than the fraction of 
votes needed for passage.” See, e.g., Mark Fey, A Note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Supermajority 
Voting Rules 1, 6 (July 2001) forthcoming in SOC. CHOICE AND WELFARE.  Nonetheless, the probability of 
the truth of a majority decision is severely undercut (and so is Condorcet’s Theorem) when the probable 
truth of some voters’ opinions are less than one-half or equal to one-half. See Essai, supra note 50, at 49-
51; see also Jacob Paroush, Stay Away From Fair Coins: A Condorcet Jury Theorem, 1998 SOC. CHOICE 
AND WELFARE 15, 19 (1998) (the votes of individuals whose probable truth of opinion is close to one-half 
are essentially meaningless as such votes only “introduce ‘noise’ to any social choice.”). 
54 Essai, supra note 50, at 47; see also CONDORCET, supra note 50, at 235. 
55 Essai, supra note 50, at 47; see also CONDORCET, supra note 50, at 235.  Although independence can be 
relaxed, we put dependence aside as it simply complicates matters needlessly.  The mathematics becomes 
considerably more complex, requires knowledge of the dependency, and involves some counterintuitive 
conditions (such as ignorance can increase the probability of a correct outcome).  While it is not impossible 
that a version of the Condorcet Theorem incorporating dependence would explain jury decision-making, it 
is highly implausible, and in any event would be virtually impossible to verify. See Krishna K. Ladha, The 
Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 617 (1992); see also 
Bernard N. Grofman, Guillermo Owen, & Scott L. Feld, Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15 
THEORY & DECISION 261 (1983).  Levmore does not discuss independence, but he is obviously relying on 
the original version of the Condorcet Theorem, which requires independence. See, e.g., Levmore, supra 
note 10, at 735, n.23 (Levmore employs a standard model here). 
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(4) Complex decisions (or decisions in which there are more than two 
ways of casting a vote) are broken into a series of simple (binary) 
propositions, each of which are voted upon.56 
 
 Condorcet was attempting to justify the decision making of various groups, such 
as juries and legislative assemblies.57  Although the concerns here are the formal aspects 
and setting of modern jury trials rather than the sociology of who is “enlightened,”58 
nonetheless the differences between French assemblies and modern day jury trials should 
immediately raise a concern about the applicability of Condorcet’s Theorem.  For 
Condorcet, an “enlightened” voter had all information necessary to make a reasoned and 
informed decision.59  As Condorcet put it: “[Voters] should not be deprived of the means 
of forming an opinion,” and should be able to “enlighten themselves on the grounds and 
the consequences of the decision proposed to them.”60  This plainly does not describe a 
trial where both party control of the evidence and the rules of evidence themselves 
repeatedly remove certain information from the jury’s consideration.61  Moreover, jurors 
are universally instructed not to conduct an independent investigation or to gather any 
                                                     
56 Essai, supra note 50, at 50; see also CONDORCET, supra note 50, at 237. 
57 Essai, supra note 50, at 48-49.  
58 See id., at 47, 49-50.  Condorcet’s “enlightened” individual was one who was highly educated as 
Condorcet believed education promoted reasoned and illuminate thinking – two important factors when it 
came to establishing truth in decision-making. See generally Marquis de Condorcet, On the Nature of 
Public Instruction (1791) [hereinafter Public Instruction] translated in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 50, 
at 105.  In fact, in his biography of Turgot, Condorcet wrote, “[it] is easy to establish assemblies; but their 
utility depends entirely upon the education of their members and the intelligence that inspires them. . . .” 
CONDORCET, supra note 50, at 292. 
59 In a later work, On the Principles of the Constitutional Plan Presented to the National Assembly, 
Condorcet notes that an enlightened voter is one who is informed on the question, or rather one who has 
“match[ed] to his enlightenment and powers of intelligence the study he is obliged to make of a question.” 
On the Principles of the Constitutional Plan Presented to the National Assembly (1793) [hereinafter 
Constitutional Plan] translated in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 50, at 143, 149. 
60 Id. at 159.  This statement also has consequences for juries in criminal trials; such juries are often 
instructed not to consider the subject of penalty or punishment during deliberation. See, e.g., California 
Jury Instructions: Criminal, Jury Must Not Consider Penalty – Non-Capital Cases § 17.42, LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, CALJIC file. 
61 For example, rules against admitting hearsay or against admitting privileged information keep vital 
information from jurors, and thus, keep them from being fully informed.  
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information from a source outside the trial.62  This is the exact opposite of the conditions 
Condorcet was theorizing about.  Similarly, one of the central concerns of the rules of 
evidence – the unfair prejudicing of jurors by information – captures again virtually the 
exact opposite of the decision maker Condorcet had in mind – a decision maker who 
would be informed, not prejudiced, by information.  Once we lose Condorcet’s 
enlightened (informed) voters, we have lost the assurance that, by way of the CJT, a 
jury’s overall decision is probably right. 
These differences between decision makers in Jacobin France and modern jurors 
highlight the formal flaws in Levmore’s argument.  Modern jurors are not picked because 
they are enlightened, and certainly not because there is a greater than .5 probability that 
each juror will independently reach the correct result.  Nor are they charged to enlighten 
themselves and then vote according to their conscience.  Quite the contrary, the necessary 
conditions of the Condorcet Theorem are systematically ground out of the process.  
Modern jury trials explicitly involve a collective decision that can only be reached, in 
either direction, with a supermajority vote, and in which deference and compromise are 
encouraged as part of an intensively collaborative effort.  Juries are instructed to “listen 
with deference to the views of others,”63 to attempt to “resolve [ ] differences and come 
to a common conclusion,”64 and to “deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement.”65  
                                                     
62 See, e.g., California Jury Instructions: Civil, Pre-Trial Admonition § .50, LEXIS, Nexis Library, BAJI 
File; Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, Preliminary Instruction § 1.1, LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, FLJINS File. 
63 California Jury Instructions: Civil, Deadlocked Jury Admonition § 15.60, LEXIS, Nexis Library, BAJI 
File. 
64 Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, Jury Deadlocked § 7.3, LEXIS, Nexis Library, FLJINS 
File. 
65 Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Deadlocked Jury § 1.05 (West 2000); see also New York Pattern 
Jury Instructions, Conclusion §1:28, available on Westlaw database NY-PJI. 
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These instructions directly contradict the Condorcet requirement of independence.66  
Obviously, the probable truth of a juror’s vote is not independent of another juror’s vote 
if he defers to the opinions of others or actively searches for consensus.  Indeed, merely 
limiting the jurors to observing the same evidence will undermine independence.67  
Moreover, the super-majority decision rule applicable to juries requires negotiation and 
compromise that may take a jury away from the decision that a majority, voting 
independently, might have reached, which again simply contradicts the assumptions 
underlying the CJT.  Consequently, the CJT is not applicable to jury decision making, 
and there is no reason, so far as the CJT is concerned, to think that even a large jury will 
be more likely than not to make a “true” decision.  Thus, the conjunction problem 
remains and the CJT fails to explain the law’s suppression of the troublesome product 
rule. 
In a subsequent article, Levmore notes that Jury Theorem “purists” allow no room for 
deliberation, implying that the Theorem still has some traction for those willing to be a 
little less particular about its formal requirements.68  This remark captures nicely our 
disquietude with Levmore’ argument, for “purity” is not a measure of how algorithms are 
used; rather, they either apply or do not apply, or are applied correctly or incorrectly.  In 
any event, deliberation is not the problem,69 lack of independence is.  For Condorcet, 
“deliberation” was a tool to clarify the issues so that they may be clearly and definitively 
                                                     
66 See Essai, supra note 50, at 47; see also CONDORCET, supra note 50, at 235. 
67 Ladha, supra note 55, at 623 (“Clearly, the votes of real-life jurors will be correlated because the jurors 
hear the same evidence presented by various witnesses, the public prosecutor, and the defense attorney.”). 
68 Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 87, 90 (2002) 
[hereinafter Ruling Majorities].  
69 Although Condorcet’s work on the Jury Theorem is not clear on the question of deliberation, his later 
work, Constitutional Plan set forth a system of deliberative assemblies designed according to the dictates 
of the CJT, and designed to rule France under the new constitutional regime. See generally Constitutional 
Plan, supra note 59. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
20 
presented as binary questions,70 and was an aid in the process of self-enlightenment and 
reflection.71  Nonetheless, if deliberation occurs, the probability that an individual votes 
for a “true” alternative must remain statistically independent of the same probability for 
another voter in order for the CJT to operate successfully.72 
Although deliberation is not necessarily a problem under the CJT, Levmore’s reason 
for arguing that it is not a problem is unconvincing and ad hoc.  He asserts that 
deliberation may be useful for determining the truth of a Condorcet decision because 
“deliberation can serve to bring out ‘expert’ knowledge and assessments which (even) the 
Jury Theorem bows to.”73  Even if deliberation is able to bring out expert knowledge, 
Levmore has left the realm of the CJT.  In order for the version of the Theorem that 
Levmore is relying on to operate correctly, the probability that each voter is right must 
exceed .5, and one voter cannot influence another’s opinion,74 yet, Levmore’s argument 
assumes neither would be true if expertise were revealed.  Jurors would not vote as they 
                                                     
70 Id. at 147-48.   
71 Id.; see also Block, supra note 50, at 1013-15.  Again, although Condorcet does not discuss deliberation 
in his Essai, it is clear from his work in Constitutional Plan that deliberation should be enlightening. 
Constitutional Plan, supra note 59, at 148-49, 159 (even in deliberations rapidly undertaken, voters “should 
be able to enlighten themselves . . .”).  In effect, an individual voter uses deliberation as a learning tool. Id.  
And, as Condorcet proposed in Public Instruction, all education ought to be purely instructive and 
constructive. See generally Public Instruction, supra note 58, at 105.  Therefore, voting groups can 
deliberate and share information and opinions, but each member must then thoughtfully examine the view-
points of others, reflect upon the issues, mesh new information with his own enlightened opinion, and come 
to his own individual conclusion.  Condorcet stressed that opinions are not truth, and therefore should not 
be treated as such. Id. at 127.  Instead, opinions should be subjected to examination, and discussions should 
be reflected upon; “the aim of education can no longer be to consecrate established opinions but, on the 
contrary, to subject them to free examination. . . .” Id. at 126. 
72 David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality and the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem, 90 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 34, 38-39 (1996).  If independence is relaxed, the informational 
barriers to applying the Condorcet Theorem to jury voting are insuperable.  In any event, although Levmore 
does not carefully specify what exactly he means by the “Condorcet Theorem,” he is employing a version 
of it with independence. 
73 Levmore, supra note 10, at n.51.  In Ruling Majorities Levmore states, “deliberation has potential value 
on the Theorem’s own terms,” as it might “reveal the presence of expertise, in which case each voter is no 
longer to be regarded as equally likely to be right.” Ruling Majorities, supra note 68, at 90.   
74 Essai, supra note 50, at 47-49; see also CONDORCET, supra note 50, at 235-36. 
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believe but rather as instructed by the newly revealed expert.75  The ad hoc nature of the 
argument here is obvious.  If deliberation is a problem, it is solved, deus ex machina, by 
the arrival of expertise.76 
The invocation of expertise in this manner is implausible regardless of the dictates of 
the Condorcet Theorem.  Just as jurors are not picked with the requirements of the 
Condorcet Theorem in mind, neither are they picked on the basis of their ability to spot 
expertise among them.  For deference, as a result of identifying expertise, to guarantee 
correct outcomes, the jurors must identify it accurately, and there is no reason given to 
think that they do.  In fact, we know of nothing in jury research literature to suggest that 
jurors even engage in such a decision making strategy with any regularity, if at all.  And, 
the conjunction problem would still remain; in cases involving multiple elements (which 
includes nearly all cases), “experts,” like everyone else, are instructed to decide upon the 
probability of each separate element.  We are then right back to where we started – the 
conjunction paradox. 
2. Misapplying the CJT and Mismodeling the System of Litigation 
In addition to not accommodating the assumptions of the CJT, Levmore’s specific 
argument that findings of two elements to a .6 and a .7 probability respectively combine 
to form a conjunction “almost surely closer to 1.0 than to .42” involves a misapplication 
of the Theorem and a mismodeling of the system of litigation.  The first point has been 
                                                     
75 See Ladha, supra note 55, at 631 (reducing robust competition among different ideas leaves votes 
meaningless).  
76 We refer in the text to “the version of the Condorcet Theorem” that Levmore is relying on.  There are 
other versions, and they can indeed accommodate differing probabilities of voters being correct, among 
other things.  However, the version most applicable to Levmore’s invocation of expertise implies precisely 
the opposite of what he is arguing.  In groups the size of juries, there are various circumstances in which 
the decision of the majority will be more probably true than the decision of the most competent member of 
the group. Grofman, Owen & Feld, supra note 55, at 272. 
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exhaustively analyzed previously,77 and we will give only a single example of its 
consequences here.  The CJT requires that decisions be broken into a series of binary 
propositions.78  In a negligence case, the jury is asked something like, “Do you think 
negligence is established by a preponderance of the evidence? Do you think causation is 
established by a preponderance of the evidence?”  The jurors respond yes or no, and the 
vote of a majority will result in an answer whose probability of truth approaches 1.0.79  
Applying the CJT to Levmore’s example, where a majority has voted that the probability 
of negligence is .6 and that the probability of causation is .7, it is the truth of these 
probabilities – .6 and .7 – that approaches 1.0, and not, as Levmore suggests, the 
probabilities of the two variables themselves that approach 1.0.80  And, if, as Levmore 
states, the product rule still applies, then the “true” assessment of .6 (for negligence) and 
the “true” assessment of .7 (for causation) combine to the form the probability of their 
conjunction being .42 (and not a number closer to 1.0).81  The conjunction problem 
remains, and indeed is magnified by Levmore’s own example.82 
Perhaps the argument above does not fully engage with Levmore’s position, which 
includes a curious psychological assumption that may blunt the force of our argument.  
Levmore’s argument assumes that jurors’ assessments of the probability of an element 
are equivalent to an assessment that their response sets the floor for the probability.  
Thus, he seems to equate “an individual assessment” that something is .6 likely with “the 
                                                     
77 See generally Edelman, supra note 48. 
78 Essai, supra note 50, at 50; see also CONDORCET, supra note 50, at 237. 
79 See CONDORCET, supra note 50, at 236; see also Edelman, supra note 48, at 344.   
80 Compare CONDORCET, supra note 50, at 236 and Edelman, supra note 48, at 344-45 with Levmore, 
supra note 10, at 736.   
81 Levmore, supra note 10, at 736. 
82 As Edelman goes through carefully, other possible interpretations of Levmore’s assertion fare no better. 
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assessment of negligence [as] .6 or more.”83  This helps his argument in one sense, but 
dramatizes its ad hoc nature in another.  Equating these two gives some support for the 
proposition that the original juror assessment understates the strength of the evidence as 
perceived by these same jurors, but there is no reason given why these two should be 
equated.  Jurors are not asked to determine the minimum probability.  If anything, they 
are asked to determine the actual probability.  If asked what the dispersion over that 
number might be, there is literally no reason to think it would only be toward 1.0.  
Empirical question though it is, it is much more reasonable to think that jurors would 
identify their own assessments as either accurate or, if pressed, as the median of the likely 
range, both of which would falsify Levmore’s argument. 
There is another problem.  Take Levmore’s argument at face value, a further 
“paradox” emerges.  For the argument to be a general account of the insignificance of the 
conjunction paradox, it must be understood to mean that jury findings in which the 
probabilities of discrete elements exceed the preponderance standard will yield a 
probability of the conjunction closer to 1.0 than to the product of the two independent 
probabilities.  In essence, he is asserting that the actual conjunction of two elements is 
higher than the mean of the range from the product of the two separate probabilities to 
1.0, which explains why he asserts that the actual conjunction of two elements found to .6 
and .7 respectively will be closer to 1.0 than .42.  While this is plainly ad hoc 
undefended, still, if it is correct, the conjunction paradox is simply inverted, for it means 
that verdicts will be returned for plaintiffs only when the probability of the conjunction 
                                                     
83 Levmore, supra note 10, at 736. 
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exceeds .625.84  This is inconsistent with every justification for the proof rules of civil 
litigation of which we are aware.  It means, for example, that errors probably will be 
made disproportionately against deserving plaintiffs (rather than against deserving 
defendants under the original paradox), and it means that expected utility will not be 
maximized.  This is just another version of the same disease, the cure for which was 
thought to lie in the Condorcet Theorem. 
It is also unclear why this argument should be limited to those elements for which 
individual assessments are greater than .5.  As already pointed out, a juror who finds the 
probability to be, say, .6, can only be taken to mean precisely what is asserted, and not 
something else about the truth of the element in question.  Under Levmore’s argument, 
the actual conjunction of such assessments should be taken to be greater than the median 
of the range from the conjunction of the original assessments to 1.0, but this should be 
true regardless whether individual assessments of elements exceed .5.  Probability in 
Levmore’s conception is a continuous variable, and there is no reason why a finding of 
the probability of two elements to just a little more than .5 should yield a conjunction 
greater than .625, but a finding of the probability of the same two elements to .5 (which 
does not meet the preponderance standard) should all of a sudden yield a substantially 
lower conjunction.   
Now consider the logical implications of this argument.  Assume that the conjunction 
of the actual assessments of jurors is 0.0.  The mid point of the range from 0.0 to 1.0 is .5. 
Under Levmore’s argument, we should convert the 0.0 figure into a greater than .5 
                                                     
84 If two elements are found to just slightly more than .5, then their product will be approximately .25; .625 
is the mean of the range from .25 to 1.0. 
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finding, satisfying the burden of persuasion.  This also means that plaintiffs always win, 
no matter what the proof is.  An argument that leads to such results cannot be correct. 
B. Supermajority Voting Rules and Conjunction 
Levmore offers an additional “supermajority voting rules” theory to help rationalize 
the “math-law divide.”85  Levmore argues that, “When the majority of a group agrees that 
a given threshold (such as [preponderance of the evidence]) has been met, we can 
normally reason that the standard has been exceeded by a significant amount, especially 
where a supermajority voting requirement is utilized.”86  Accordingly, suppressing the 
product rule where supermajority voting applies is “often harmless.”87  Levmore offers 
the supermajority voting theory as both a complement to the CJT and as a potential 
“alternative” to the product rule, but like his argument concerning the CJT, his 
supermajority voting argument mismodels the system he is theorizing about and has 
hidden curious and problematic psychological assumptions. 
Levmore argues that:  
When a supermajority of a reasonably sized jury responds affirmatively to 
the [preponderance of the evidence] questions it is asked to consider, we 
can guess that the median and mean of the entire jury are well above .5 for 
each question.  This gives us reason to be fairly comfortable with a system 
that suppresses the product rule and asks only whether a supermajority 
believes the [preponderance of the evidence] has been met for each 
question. . .88  
 
The example he gives is of 9 of 12 jurors who conclude that negligence and 
causation are more likely than not true: 
                                                     
85 In Conjunction and Aggregation, Professor Saul Levmore coined the phrase “math-law divide” to 
describe the obvious tension between legal practice and probabilistic reasoning. Levmore, supra note 10, at 
723. 
86 Id. at 740. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 744. 
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. . . [I]t is easy to imagine that each supermajority group of nine 
incorporated individual assessments ranging from just over .5 all the way 
to 1.0.  . . . In the absence of additional information about the actual 
distribution, we might even proceed amateurishly and recklessly, and 
hazard a guess that the average assessment of this group of nine is .75, 
halfway between the marginal .51 vote and the ceiling offered by 1.0.  If 
we apply the product rule, then .75 times .75 is about .56, exceeding the 
marker of the POE rule.89 
 
The argument here is purely ad hoc.  It specifies one of an infinite range of 
distributions to demonstrate that there is not a problem, but neglects all others in the 
range.  The argument requires that the relevant range of probability be from the lowest 
assessment of those jurors voting for the plaintiff to 1.0 and that the “average 
assessment” of the entire group be the median of that range, but either could be false in 
any particular case.  Consider, for example, a negligence case in which nine of twelve, or 
even twelve of twelve, jurors determine that the preponderance of the evidence standard 
has been minimally met as to negligence and causation, but who also believe the 
probability of negligence and the probability of causation each lie between .51 and .7.90  
Plainly, under this example, the conjunction problem remains.  Levmore dismisses such 
cases as “unlikely.”  They do not appear unlikely to us, and more importantly he neglects 
to tell us how we know what is likely or unlikely about these matters.91 
Taking his argument at face value uncovers yet another problem.  Suppose that under 
supermajority voting the best estimate is that the mean assessment lies between the 
                                                     
89 Id. at 741. 
90 We are assuming here that it is sensible to directly apply to jury decision making the model of 
conventional probability Levmore is employing.  If it is sensible, his argument suffers from the disabilities 
noted in the text.  As we develop in Part V, infra, we doubt this way of looking at things in general is very 
helpful, informative, or accurate. 
91 Levmore, supra note 10, at 743.  The example he gives is a bit more extreme than ours, and thus a bit 
more unlikely, but disposing of an extreme example as “unlikely” when it is just one of a numerous set of 
related, and considerably more likely, alternatives, does not dispose of the set from which the unlikely 
candidate is drawn. 
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lowest possible value and the ceiling of 1.0.  Suppose further that the law is attempting to 
maximize expected value or correct results, so that verdicts should be returned for 
plaintiffs when the probability of their story as a whole exceeds .5 (which is the 
assumption Levmore is operating under).  Now consider a case in which there is 
agreement that there is high probability of negligence, with the lower bound being, say, 
.9.  That means, under Levmore’s argument, that we should assume that the median 
assessment is .95 (half way between .9 and 1.0).92  What finding must be made on 
causation in order to further the system’s objectives?  The answer is clear: Whatever 
value would result in the conjunction of the two elements exceeding .5, which is 
approximately .53 (.53 x .95 = .5035).  Under Levmore’s theory, to get a median of .53 
requires agreement that the possible range contains .53 as its median.  That range is from 
.06 to 1.0.  Thus, if the jurors agree that the minimum possible probability of causation is 
.06, they should return a verdict for the plaintiff.  To generalize, if errors or utilities are to 
be optimized, then jurors should be instructed to apply a sliding scale: If the probability 
of one element goes up, the probability necessary for a plaintiff’s verdict on the other 
goes down.  One sees no such thing in general, of course.93  Thus, either the law is wrong 
                                                     
92 One difficulty is that Levmore does not clearly specify his position, but we think the argument in the text 
is a fair, and indeed conservative, logical reconstruction.  In discussing his argument, he says that if “the 
artificial device of the jury having reported its precise .51 breakpoint” is dropped, “our best estimate is 
undoubtedly higher than before. . .” Id. at 742. 
93 This is not to say that the law does not evolve in part because of proof issues.  Some states now allow 
recovery for “lost chance” in torts. See, e.g., Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Iowa 1998); Perez 
v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 592 (Nev. 1991); McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc. 741 P.2d 467, 
476 (Okla. 1987); Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 371 (S.D. 2000); Herskovits v. Group Health 
Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 466, 467 (Wash. 1998).  This can be viewed as an attenuation of the 
causation requirement in the face of good evidence of breach.  Nonetheless, the episodic nature of such 
adjustments confirms the textual point of the general lack of evidence that similar adjustments are made 
through the evidentiary process. 
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in not providing such instructions and the present practices systematically subvert the 
system’s policies, or more plausibly the argument is simply wrong.94 
One last point – juror psychology.  Return to our example involving jurors estimating 
that individual assessments of liability lie somewhere between .51 and .7, and Levmore’s 
claim that this is unlikely.  The claim actually is one about juror psychology – how jurors 
are likely to assess masses of evidence.  We think our suggestion is considerably more 
likely than Levmore’s to be a fair representation of what actually occurs.95  His involves a 
random distribution over wide ranges of probability, but no reason for this is given.  And 
there are reasons to doubt it will occur.  Each juror attends the same trial, witnesses the 
same events, hears the same evidence, and within loose constraints comes from the same 
milieu.96  A priori one would think that individual assessments of liability would run over 
a rather small range of probabilities rather than across the entire range of possibilities.  
The more diverse the jurors, the less likely this is to be true, of course, but still there is 
great commonality among those seated as jurors in any particular trial.97 
There is at least some reason to believe that trials will involve evidence with a 
relatively small range of probability.  George Priest and Benjamin Klein have argued that 
when either the plaintiff (or defendant) has a very high (or very low) probability of 
succeeding on the claim, cases are less likely to be litigated and more likely to be 
                                                     
94 We explain how the argument is wrong in Part V, infra.  It mismodels the actual task at trial. 
95 Neither is very likely, however, as we explain in Part V, infra. 
96 Ladha, supra note 55, at 623 (“Clearly, the votes of real-life jurors will be correlated because the jurors 
hear the same evidence presented by various witnesses, the public prosecutor, and the defense attorney.”). 
97 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 488 (1966) (This work demonstrates that the 
first vote of a jury is an extremely good predictor of the final result, which suggests that jurors perceive a 
narrow rather than large range of probability assessments); see also Marla R. Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, 
First-Ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 175 (1995). 
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settled.98  Cases are more likely to be litigated when the “dispute is most problematic,”99 
which is when the case on the evidence is close and there is real uncertainty about its 
outcome.100  Accordingly, assessments of liability in litigated cases may hover closer to 
the .51 mark rather than run the gamut from .51 to .99.101 
C. Judge as Fact Finders and Other Curiosities 
Arguments about proof rules must include or distinguish bench and jury trials, as 
there is nothing in the law that suggests the proof rules apply differently to judges than 
juries.  Levmore notes this, but puts it aside.102  This is inadequate.  There are many 
bench trials in the United States every year.103  If everything Levmore says about juries is 
true, then the law should be quite different for bench trials, unless the law is indeed an 
                                                     
98 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-17 
(1984).   
99 Id. at 17. 
100 Id. at 16.  It is important to note, that the Priest-Klein model rests on a number of relatively restrictive 
assumptions including that the stakes of disputes are symmetric to both parties. Id. at 4-5, 20.  Therefore, if 
there are differences in the stakes of litigation to the parties, the decision to litigate may vary slightly, and 
the theory, along with the 50 percent plaintiff win rate predicted by Priest and Klein, may not hold 
perfectly.  Those critiquing the Priest-Klein model suggest that an asymmetric-information theory (rather 
than Priest-Klein’s divergent-expectations theory) better explains trial outcomes; according to the critics, 
this is especially true in medical malpractice, product liability, employment discrimination and antitrust 
cases where plaintiff win rates tend to drop below 50 percent. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, An Asymmetric-
Information Model of Litigation, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 153 (2002).  Other critics of the model have set 
forth a competing view on how cases get to trial.  While Priest and Klein suggest that trials generally occur 
when the competing parties err in their estimates of a likely judgment, others suggest that a trial is the result 
of strategic bargaining that backfired. See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); see also Frank B. Cross, In Praise 
of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) (“The relatively high general tort rates are quite 
consistent with the predictions of Priest and Klein’s fifty percent hypothesis, although the low product 
liability plaintiff win rates are suspicious and evidence that strategic litigation may be transpiring.”); 
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection 
of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (“Priest and Klein’s intuitively appealing model of the 
selection of cases for trial provides a useful starting point for examining actual litigation.  From that 
starting point we proceed to find strong evidence of strategic bargaining . . . and more than a hint that such 
bargaining is a major force in determining which cases fail to settle.”). 
101 Again, we must caution that we doubt that analyzing jury decision making from a conventional 
probabilistic point of view is terribly cogent. See supra note 90, and Part V, infra. 
102 Levmore, supra note 10, at 752. 
103 For example, in 1996, there were an estimated 15,638 tort, contract, and real property trial cases in the 
75 largest counties in the United States. U.S. Depart of Justice, Civil Justice Statistics: State Courts, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/civil.htm (last revised on Oct. 1, 2001).  Approximately 10,616 of those cases 
were jury trial cases while 4,628 were bench trial cases. Id.  
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ass.  But, if it is an ass, it is not likely susceptible to being understood through 
algorithmic approaches like Levmore’s.  As we will discuss in Part V, we doubt the 
problem is in the law so much as in the methods of inquiry brought to it in this instance. 
There is one other curiosity deserving of mention.  Levmore’s arguments are 
structured for a case involving two elements.  As we elaborate in the next section,104 there 
are virtually no such cases, and even the case he employs – a simple negligence case – 
virtually always has multiple elements.105  To employ Levmore’s argument to the 
phenomenon under investigation – the actual system of litigation – requires relaxing the 
artificial assumption of two elements.  Doing so has unfortunate consequences.  First, 
multiple elements make a complete hash of the argument about supermajority voting.  As 
elements multiply, the conjunction of the means of the various ranges of probability of 
each element will quickly go toward 0.0, which means that defendants should almost 
always win.  Second, multiple elements do not ameliorate the surprising result of the 
Condorcet argument that, as the probability as actually assessed by the jury reaches 0.0, 
we can be confident that the actual conjunction is greater than .5, and thus plaintiffs 
should always win.  It simply makes the argument seem more bizarre; no matter how 
elements proliferate, (apparently making a plaintiff’s case more difficult), plaintiffs 
should always win because the actual conjunction will always be greater than the median 
of the range from the product of the individual probabilities and 1.0.  With added 
elements, such a product might get closer to 0.0, but it will never be less than 0.0, and the 
median of the range from the lowest possible figure of 0.0 to 1.0 is .5.  When the artificial 
                                                     
104 See also Part II, supra.  All the pattern instructions reproduced there have more than two elements, as 
well. 
105 See Part IV.B and note 121, infra. 
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limit of two elements is relaxed, we are left with one argument that plaintiffs should 
always win, and another that defendants should almost always win.  We suggest that this 
leaves us without any plausible arguments. 
IV. MICROECONOMICS AND THE CONJUNCTION PROBLEM 
Professor Alex Stein thinks the explanation of the conjunction paradox lies in a 
microeconomic analysis of litigation.106  Stein asserts that the following probabilities 
structure civil litigation: 
(1) the probability of the litigated entitlement; 
(2) the probability of the entitlement’s breach as a cause of the litigated damages; 
and,  
(3) the probability of damages resulting from the entitlement’s breach.107 
 
On the assumption that the tort system is designed to minimize the total cost of accidents, 
which is the primary claim of the microeconomic analysis of torts, each of these 
probabilities should be an ex ante probability, and liability should depend upon the 
probability of their conjunction exceeding .5.108  However, because of numerous 
constraints of the real world – for example, “adjudication always follows, rather than 
precedes, the litigated event” – it is invariably too costly to determine the ex ante 
probability of breach.109  Thus, if the law desires to achieve the optimal level of 
deterrence, then it must find “an economically justified surrogate” for the first-best proof 
                                                     
106 See generally Stein, supra note 11. 
107 Id. at 1203 (“Take an ordinary civil lawsuit in which the plaintiff must establish three independent 
elements: (1) . . . entitlement . . . (2) . . . breach . . . (3) . . . damage . . .”), 1216 (“In a paradigmatic civil 
trial, the following probabilities are at work: (1) . . . entitlement . . . (2) . . . breach . . . (3) . . . damage . . .”), 
1221 (“Under existing doctrine, a lawsuit will succeed if each of its following three elements is more 
probable than not: (1) . . . entitlement . . . (2) . . . breach . . . (3) . . . damage . . .”). 
108 Id. at 1216. 
109 Id. at 1220. 
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requirement of ex ante probability.110  Stein argues that “adjusting” the ex post 
probability of breach by the ex ante probability of entitlement forms such a surrogate;111 
he states, 
By employing [the ex ante probability of entitlement] as the probability-
aligning tool that brings [the ex post probability of breach] and the [ex 
ante probability of breach] closer to each other, the law also removes it 
from the standard multiplication formula for conjunctive probabilities.  
This removal is justified by the law’s deterrence policy.  In accordance 
with that policy, the law is primarily interested in the ex ante probability 
of breach; and because this probability cannot be determined at trial at an 
affordable cost, the law substitutes for it a suitable surrogate.  Under this 
framework, [the ex ante probability of entitlement] serves as a 
misalignment-corrector for [the ex post probability of breach], not as its 
conjunctive companion.112  
 
Stein does not elaborate on the nature of the adjustment that occurs, but he does not 
appear to be making an analytical point,113 and for good reason.  The relationship 
between the various probabilities that he has specified logically could be infinitely varied, 
and there is no analytic reason to think that the configuration he specifies is more likely 
than anything else.  Thus, he must be making a counterfactual empirical point.  He must 
be asserting that a system with infinite resources that employed the economically optimal 
rules would obtain results quite similar to those of the actual system of litigation.114 
                                                     
110 Id. at 1221-23. 
111 “Because the ex ante probability of breach does not exonerate the transgressor under the entitlement’s 
conditions, this probability becomes immaterial.  The entitlement’s probability will thus dominate the ex 
ante probability of breach as an incentive for potential transgressors.  Aware of the entitlement’s nature and 
probability, a potential transgressor must introduce an appropriate adjustment in his ex ante probability of 
breach.  This adjustment will substitute any initial level of his ex ante probability of breach with the level 
of the entitlement’s probability.” Id. at 1223-24. 
112 Id. at 1224 (emphasis added). 
113 He provides no demonstration generating his assertion as a deduction from acceptable premises; 
therefore we conclude it is an empirical rather than an analytical claim.  If it is intended as an analytical 
claim, it must stand as an unsupported conjecture, which amounts to the same thing. 
114 Stein, supra note 11, at 1223-24. 
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Stein’s article, like Levmore’s, is complicated, insightful, and wide ranging.115 As 
with Levmore’s, our interest is focused on the treatment of the civil burden of persuasion.  
Whatever the article’s other virtues, this part of the argument employs, like Levmore’s, a 
formal argument in an ad hoc fashion and mismodels the system of litigation that is the 
object of inquiry.116  We briefly address these two points in turn. 
A. The Formal Economic Argument 
Stein’s economic argument is creative and original, but to apply it as he does to the 
ultimate object of the inquiry requires an unjustified leap of faith.  It requires believing 
that his counterfactual assertion is true, and that, of the infinite number of ways the three 
variables (ex ante probability of entitlement, ex ante probability of breach, and ex post 
probability of breach) might relate to each other, they actually relate in precisely the 
manner necessary for the system to approximate optimal results.  Maybe they do, and 
maybe they do not so relate, but it is obviously an empirical question, and Stein gives no 
good reason to think things are as they must be for his argument to be correct. 
We may misunderstand Stein’s various constructs, but the most direct understanding 
of them leads to skepticism that things are in the real world as they must be for his 
argument to work.  For example, in the real world, every time a driver drives his car, he 
has a duty to take care that must translate, in Stein’s terms, into an ex ante probability of 
entitlement of 1.0.117  However, the ex ante probability that a person will breach his duty 
                                                     
115 For example, he makes an interesting economic argument why damages are exempt from the product 
rule. Id. at 1229. 
116 Prof. Stein might be completely indifferent to these points, as his article can be understood as an 
exercise in economic modeling.  Our interests, by contrast, are in empirical accuracy. See, e.g., Ronald J. 
Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence. 87 VA. L. REV. 1491 (2001). 
117 And “duty” is typically at such a level of generality (e.g., “duty to drive safely”) rather than at a much 
finer level (e.g., “duty not to get distracted talking to Sarah on the phone and hitting Ron in the 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
34 
of care and, for example, hit a pedestrian while talking on a cell phone, is relatively low.  
This driver and thousands of other drivers regularly talk on cell phones while driving 
without hitting pedestrians.  Nonetheless, if the driver gets distracted by his phone and 
accidentally hits a pedestrian causing some injury, he surely would be in breach of his 
duty of care with a probability of 1.0. 
Perhaps the driver in our hypothetical should be held liable, but it is not because an 
alignment of ex ante and ex post probabilities of breach is effected by the ex ante 
probability of entitlement.  Indeed, as we elaborate below, it is not even clear what this 
might mean, as the ex ante probability of entitlement in negligence cases is a question of 
law called “duty” in most United States jurisdictions, the probability of which is surely 
virtually always 1.0 or 0.0.  It is only in the unusual case of first impression in tort that it 
would be sensible to talk of any other probability of entitlement.  Nor should liability in 
this hypothetical depend on the assumed prohibitive cost of establishing the ex ante 
probability of breach, because in fact it would be quite easy and cheap to establish within 
rough parameters.  The amount of driving that occurs can be estimated fairly accurately, 
as can the number of accidents involving cell phone use and pedestrians, and simple 
division yields a good estimate of the ex ante probability of breach.  And, the driver’s 
own driving and accidents patterns can be employed as well.  
Perhaps we misconstrue what the ex ante probability is.  Perhaps the ex ante 
knowledge of the driver, the probability of the pedestrian being in the wrong place at the 
wrong time, and the social value of using cell phones should also be taken into account, 
                                                                                                                                                              
crosswalk”).  If the concept of duty migrates toward the more finely grained, the distinction between “duty” 
and “breach” will be lost. 
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and so on.  Doing so surely does result in making too many informational demands on the 
system, and may explain why there is almost no evidence that the negligence standard 
has been influenced by microeconomic reasoning.118  Regardless of the actual state of the 
law, if Stein’s point is to provide a surrogate for a measurement that cannot be obtained, 
obviously there is no way to know if the surrogate is an accurate approximation, and his 
economic argument fails accordingly.  It is only the ad hoc insistence that the actual 
relationship between the relevant variables entails the desired result that holds the 
argument together, but no basis to believe that is provided. 
In sum, the formalities of the microeconomic argument are held hostage to an 
unjustified and ad hoc vision of the empirical world.  Thus, there is no reason to think the 
formal argument resolves the conjunction paradox.  Even if that is not the case, however, 
the argument does not map onto the real world of litigation, to which we now turn. 
B. Mismodeling the Legal System 
Stein has offered his theory as an explanation of the conjunction paradox.  For it to be 
such, it must explain the universe of civil litigation, or at least a large part of it.119  As we 
discuss in this section, it does not do so; indeed, it does not even explain its primary 
object – simple negligence cases. 
Stein’s theory is based upon the assumption that civil trials always and only involve 
the three elements of entitlement, breach, and damage, each of which is litigated by the 
parties.120  This is an inaccurate description of the law.  A simple negligence claim 
typically involves: “(1) duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) that the breach of duty be the 
                                                     
118 See Hedgehogs supra note 4.  
119 But see supra note 116. 
120 See supra note 107, and accompanying text. 
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proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury; and (4) that plaintiff did in fact suffer actual 
injury.”121  This black letter treatment of negligence reveals at least two ways in which 
Stein’s theory mismodels the actual legal system. 
First, Stein describes civil trials as involving an “entitlement” element, which, like 
“breach” and “damage,” is litigated by the parties.122  Although it is not absolutely clear 
what Stein means by entitlement, his article suggests that “entitlement” is a synonym for 
“duty.”123  In a traditional negligence action, the parties do not litigate duty as a fact 
because “the existence of a duty is a question of law for the court to decide.”124  Thus, the 
                                                     
121 Hudson v. Snyder Body Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. 1982) (quotations and citation omitted); see 
also Maffucci v. Royal Park Ltd. Partnership, 707 A.2d 15, 24 (Conn. 1998) (“The essential elements of a 
cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury.”) 
(quotations and citation omitted); Case v. Consumers Power Co., 615 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Mich. 2000) (“To 
establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) a duty owed by 
defendant to plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages.”) (citation omitted); Febesh 
v. Elcejay Inn Corp., 555 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (“. . . for a plaintiff to establish a cause of 
action sounding in negligence, he must meet the initial burden of showing 1) the existence of a duty 
flowing from defendant to plaintiff; 2) a breach of this duty; 3) a reasonably close causal connection 
between the contact and the resulting injury; and 4) actual loss, harm or damage.”) (citation omitted); 
Colvin v. Red Steel Co., 682 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1984) (“To sustain a cause of action for negligence it is 
necessary to produce evidence of a duty, a breach of that duty, proximate cause and damage.”) (citation 
omitted).   
122 Stein, supra note 11, at 1203 (an “ordinary civil lawsuit” is one “in which the plaintiff must establish 
three independent elements . . .”). 
123 In his article, Stein utilizes a semi-real life scenario, which may better aid us in understanding what 
Stein believes to be an “entitlement.”  In Stein’s scenario, contractor “C” builds a fence for house-owner 
“H,” and guarantees that the fence will withstand bad weather. Id. at 1209-10.  The fence falls down 
(because of bad weather) and causes damage. Id.  The elements of breach and damage are relatively clear in 
this scenario.  The entitlement element is less clear, but appears to be H’s entitlement to rely upon C’s 
guarantee – or put another way, C had a duty to construct the fence to withstand bad weather and to live up 
to his guarantee. See id.  In this scenario it seems that H’s entitlement is interchangeable with C’s duty.  
Thus, we will proceed on the belief that “entitlement = duty.”  
124 Reed v. Beachy Const. Corp., 781 N.E.2d 1145, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis added); see also 
Doe 1 v. Murrieta, 102 Cal. App. 4th 899, 913 (2002) (“The determination of whether there is a duty is a 
question of law.”) (citation omitted); Maffucci, 707 A.2d at 24 (“The existence of a duty is a question of 
law. . . .”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Int’l Memory Products of Ill., Inc. v. Metro. Pier, 781 
N.E.2d 505, 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law to be determined 
by the court.”); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Mass. 1989) (“There 
can be negligence only where there is a duty to be careful, and whether there is a duty to be careful is a 
question of law.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc., 
773 N.E.2d 485, 467 (N.Y. 2002) (“As we have often said, the existence and scope of a duty is a question 
of law.”); Bank of America NT & SA v. Hubert, 62 P.3d 904, 911 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (“the existence of 
a duty is a question of law.”).  Questions of law may be questions of fact. See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. 
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jury in negligence cases merely decides “whether an existing duty has been breached and 
if so, whether such breach was the legal cause of a claimant’s injury or damage.”125  
Second, even if duty is taken out of the picture, the jury still decides more than one other 
element, and is instructed to apply the burden of persuasion to each of them, not to their 
conjunction.126  Thus, the conjunction problem remains.  To be sure, simple negligence 
cases involve only barely more elements than the number Stein identifies, but that is all 
that is necessary for the conjunction paradox to be formally present. 
Moreover, however Stein’s argument is understood, it does not apply to a wide range 
of litigation.  Many forms of liability do not include anything that much looks like what 
Stein refers to as an “entitlement.”  For example, matrimonial dissolution actions,127 will 
contests,128 paternity suits,129 zoning actions,130 and anti-trust actions131 all appear to be 
                                                                                                                                                              
Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 2003).  However, 
even if this is so, they are not treated the same as factual findings at trial. 
125 Sanderson v. Eckerd Corp., 780 So.2d 930, 933 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
126 See, e.g., supra notes 20, 30, and accompanying text, and infra note 138. 
127 For example, in an abandonment proceeding, the complaining spouse is not litigating that the 
abandoning spouse had any duty not to leave, or that he/she had any entitlement not to become a victim of 
abandonment.  Indeed, the abandoned spouse is simply attempting to prove that that he/she has in fact been 
abandoned. See, e.g., New York Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Divorce – Abandonment § 5:4, available 
on Westlaw database NY PJI (The instruction states that “the plaintiff must establish that (he, she) did not 
consent to the defendant’s departure and that the defendant did not intend to return and did not return for a 
period of at least one year.”).  Similarly, proceedings adjudicating the existence of a common law marriage 
do not involve any duty/entitlement of one party to the other. See Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, 
Common Law Marriage – Elements § 69.02, available on Westlaw database AL-APJICIV (The instruction 
states that in order for the plaintiff or defendant to establish the existence of a common law marriage, he or 
she must prove “the following essential elements existed: 1. The capacity to enter into a common law 
marriage; 2. The mutual intent to be husband and wife; 3. Public recognition of the relationship as a 
marriage; and 4. Open or public assumption of marital duties and obligations.”). 
128 In a will contest concerning testamentary capacity, or concerning whether or not a will has been duly 
executed, one would be quite hard pressed to find Stein’s “entitlement” element. See, e.g., New York 
Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Will Contests – Testamentary Capacity § 7:48, available on Westlaw 
database NY PJI (In a case involving testamentary capacity, the jury must decide whether the testator was 
of “sound mind and memory” at the time of the execution of the will.  The elements set forth for proof are: 
“First: [the testator] must understand that (he, she) is making a will. . . .; Second: the testator must be aware 
of the nature, extent and condition of (his, her) property. . . .; Third: the testator must be able to recall the 
persons who ordinarily would be the natural objects of (his, her) bounty, such as relatives, dependents, and 
the people with whom (he, she) has been associated, and their relationship to or association or connection 
with (him, her). . . .”); New York Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Will Contests – Due Execution § 7:45, 
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devoid of a litigated “entitlement,” at least in the sense Professor Stein uses the term.  
Consider also, an action based on Illinois’ Dram Shop Act – the standard jury instruction 
given in such cases reads: 
The Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
1. That [intoxicated person] was intoxicated at the time of the [collision]. 
2. That the defendant . . . sold or gave intoxicating liquor consumed by 
[intoxicated person]. 
3. That the liquor thus consumed caused the intoxication . . . . 
4. That [intoxicated person’s] intoxication was at least one cause of the 
occurrence in question. 
5. That as a result of the occurrence plaintiff suffered [damages]. 
                                                                                                                                                              
available on Westlaw database NY PJI (The instruction states that a will must “be executed in accordance 
with four statutory requirements: First, the testator must sign at the end of the will.  Second, (he, she) must 
(sign in the presence of, acknowledge (his, her) signature to) at least two witnesses.  Third, the testator 
must make known to the witnesses that the instrument is (his, her) will.  Fourth, (he, she) must request each 
person to act as an attesting witness. . . . [The jury] should consider each of the questions separately.”). 
129 In a paternity suit, the parties are merely litigating whether (alleged father) defendant is in fact the father 
of (mother) plaintiff’s child; the plaintiff is not entitled to anything at this stage, nor does the defendant owe 
a duty to anyone at this stage. See, e.g., Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Paternity – Burden of 
Proof § 70.03, available on Westlaw database AL-APJICIV (The jury instruction states that the “State of 
Alabama has the burden of reasonably satisfying you from the evidence that ________ (mother) became 
pregnant by the defendant, that the child in question was born alive and is alive now, and that the defendant 
is the child’s real father.”). 
130 For example, in an appeal of a zoning classification neither party is litigating an entitlement or even 
suggesting that one party owed a duty to another for any reason.  The question before the court is merely 
whether the zoning body had a “fairly debatable reason” to apply a certain zoning classification to a 
particular piece of property. See, e.g., Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Zoning – Appeal Seeking 
Variance § 60.01, available on Westlaw database AL-APJICIV. 
131 See, e.g., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions: Civil, Sherman Act – Essential Elements of a Plaintiff’s 
Claim – Price Fixing § 150.20, available on Westlaw database Fed-JI.  The elements of an anti-trust claim 
under the Sherman Act are: 
 
First: That defendants _______ have combined and conspired to fix prices among 
themselves, and thus have unreasonably restrained interstate trade and commerce in the 
[specify] industry;  
Second: That defendants _______ have monopolized, and have conspired and attempted 
to monopolize, interstate trade and commerce in the [specify] industry;  
Third: That the activities of defendants _______ have proximately caused damage to 
plaintiff _______’s business and property. 
 
This instruction does not appear to include what Stein calls an “entitlement,” and clearly, the 
parties are not litigating an entitlement/duty element here. 
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If you find . . . that each of these propositions has been proved, then your 
verdict should be for the plaintiff.132 
 
Even if something in this type of case would pass as a litigated “entitlement” – such as 
the claimant was entitled to have the bar owner not serve intoxicating liquor to the 
intoxicated person who caused the claimant damage – the Dram Shop instruction, much 
like a simple negligence instruction, contains more elements than Stein’s scheme allows. 
So, too, does much of litigation.  Stein’s argument merely purports to explain why the 
probability of entitlement need not be multiplied by the probability of breach, and why 
the probability of damage need not be multiplied by either,133 but the standard case does 
not involve only these elements (probably no case involves only those elements).  The 
simple negligence instruction and the Dram Shop instruction are not anomalies.  We have 
already given numerous examples of this, and could give a virtually endless list of pattern 
instructions involving more than three elements.  Some further examples: 
--In Illinois, negligence claims concerning an injury caused by a condition present on 
a specific piece of property involve six elements: 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
First: That there was [a condition of the defendant’s (land) 
(property)] which presented an unreasonable risk. . . . 
Second: That the defendant knew . . . that the condition of his 
[land] [property] involved an unreasonable risk of harm. . . . 
Third: That defendant should have anticipated that persons on the 
premises would not . . . realize the danger. . . . 
Fourth: That the defendant . . . was negligent.  
Fifth: That the plaintiff was injured. 
                                                     
132 Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Dram Shop Act – Burden of Proof – Injury to Person or 
Property by an Intoxicated Person § 150.02 (West 2000) (emphasis added).  
133 Stein, supra note 11, at 1223-24, 1229. 
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Sixth: That the condition of defendant’s [land] [property] was a 
proximate cause of the [injury] [damage] to the plaintiff. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these 
propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the 
defendant. . . .134 
--in Indiana, a products liability claim involves seven elements:  
The plaintiff must prove each of the following propositions by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
1. The defendant was a manufacturer of the product . . . alleged to 
be defective and was in the business of selling the product; 
2. The defendant sold, leased or otherwise put the product into the 
stream of commerce; 
3. The product was in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to users or consumers . . .; 
4. The plaintiff was in a class of persons the defendant should 
reasonably have foreseen as being subject to the harm caused by 
the defective condition; 
5. The product was expected to and did reach the plaintiff without 
substantial alteration of the condition in which the product was 
sold by the defendant; 
6. The plaintiff or plaintiff’s property was physically harmed; and 
7. The product was a proximate cause of the harm to the plaintiff 
or the plaintiff’s property.135 
--in Mississippi, medical malpractice claims involve five elements: 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that: 
1. The plaintiff was a patient in the defendant’s hospital; and  
2. While a patient in the hospital, the plaintiff was suffering from a 
mental and physical condition; and  
3. The defendant should have reasonably been aware of the 
plaintiff’s condition; and  
4. The defendant failed to provide the care and attention that the 
patient’s condition reasonably required in that it [describe claimed 
negligent act(s)]; and  
                                                     
134 Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Burden of Proof – Negligence Only – Injury Caused by 
Condition of the Premises § B120.09 (West 2000) (emphasis added). 
135 Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Products Liability Against Manufacturer § 7.03, LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, INCVJI File. 
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5. The defendant’s failure to provide such care and attention was 
the sole proximate cause or proximate contributing cause of 
plaintiff's injuries;  
then your verdict shall be for the plaintiff. 
However, if you believe the plaintiff has failed to show any one of the 
above elements by a preponderance of the evidence in this case, then your 
verdict shall be for the defendant.136  
--and, once again, in Illinois, a case involving liability to trespassing children requires 
the plaintiff to prove “each of the following” six elements: 
First: That the defendant knew . . . that children frequented defendant’s 
premises. 
Second: That there was a (structure) (activity) on defendant’s premises 
which was dangerous to children . . . . 
Third: That the expense or inconvenience to the defendant in protecting 
children against the risk would be slight in comparison to the risk of harm 
to them. 
Fourth: That defendant acted or failed to act . . . [and was therefore] 
negligent. 
Fifth: That plaintiff was injured. 
Sixth: That the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the injury . . 
. to the plaintiff.137 
                                                     
136 Mississippi Model Jury Instructions: Civil, Hospitals – General Negligence Instruction § 14:1, available 
on Westlaw database MSPRACJIC (emphasis added).     
137 Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, Burden of Proof – Liability for Injury to Trespassing Children § 
120.04 (West 2000) (emphasis added).  Other examples include:  
--a disparate impact claim under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act which involves four 
elements.  The jury instruction reads: 
Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. Plaintiff was [not hired] [describe other specific discriminatory act]; 
2. Plaintiff was 40 years of age or older at the time of the [failure to hire] [describe other specific 
discriminatory act]; 
3. Defendant had a specific [employment practice] [selection criterion] that caused plaintiff to be 
excluded from [a job] [describe other specific discriminatory act] because of plaintiff's age; and 
4. Defendant's [employment practice] [selection criterion] had a substantial disparate impact on 
persons 40 years of age or older. 
KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & HON. WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTION § 
173.21 (5th ed. 2000). 
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In each of the above jury instructions, each of the elements must be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence,138 there is an abundance of them, and it is difficult to see 
how any aligning of ex ante and ex post probabilities is occurring; and even if it is, the 
formal conjunction paradox remains. 
V. THE NATURE OF JURIDICAL PROOF 
Neither Levmore’s nor Stein’s argument disposes of the conjunction paradox as a 
formal matter.  We suspect nobody can explain it formally, but we can explain why the 
conjunction paradox probably does not have perverse effects in the real world.  The 
                                                                                                                                                              
--a California claim based upon hostile environment harassment involves the following eight elements: 
1. The defendant was a[n] [employer] [ (other) ]; 
2. The plaintiff was a[n] [employee of] [ (other) ] defendant; 
3. The defendant engaged in harassing conduct directed toward the plaintiff, or plaintiff personally 
witnessed the harassing conduct and it took place in [his] [her] immediate work environment; 
4. [ (protected status) ] was a motivating factor for the harassment; 
5. This conduct was unwelcome and sufficiently severe or pervasive that it had the purpose or effect of 
altering the conditions [of plaintiff's [prospective] employment] [under which the plaintiff provided 
services] and creating an intimidating, hostile, abusive, or offensive working environment; 
6. The environment created by the conduct would have been perceived as intimidating, hostile, 
abusive, or offensive by a reasonable person in the same position as the plaintiff; 
7. The environment created was perceived by the plaintiff as intimidating, hostile, abusive, or 
offensive; and 
8. This environment caused plaintiff injury, damage, loss, or harm. 
California Jury Instructions: Civil, Hostile Environment Harassment § 12.05, available on Westlaw 
database CA-BAJI. 
138 In addition to the cases previously cited, see Valentine, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265 (“. . . jurors must concur 
that each element of a cause of action has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added); Mile Hi Concrete, Inc. v. Matz, 842 P.2d 198, 205 (Colo. 1992) (“To establish 
liability, a plaintiff must prove each element of a claim for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.”) 
(emphasis added); Sciortino v. Wood, 829 So.2d 476, 478 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (“The plaintiff seeking 
damages in a civil action must prove each element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.”) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added); Petit v. Key Bank of Maine, 688 A.2d 427, 431 (Me. 1996) (“We have 
long recognized and applied the general rule that a plaintiff’s burden of proof in a civil action is to establish 
each factual element of a claim by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (emphasis added); Febesh, 555 
N.Y.S.2d at 47 (“Where the plaintiff fails to introduce evidence legally sufficient to support each and every 
one of [duty, breach, causation and damage] essential elements, the jury cannot properly find that the 
defendant has been negligent.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 Prof. Stein may think that the problem is not in his model but in these instructions.  That simply 
highlights the distance that can arise between theoretical modeling and empirical adequacy. 
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explanation has two related parts, one formal and one functional.  First, the paradox 
depends upon an interpretation of probability that is inapplicable to the actual 
phenomenon of civil litigation.  Second, the actual practice of civil litigation encourages 
the parties to formulate alternative hypotheses, over which a choice is made (or from 
which a choice is fashioned), rather than encouraging the litigation of elements and their 
negation, as is required for the paradox to have perverse effects.  We discuss these two 
points in turn.  Together, they demonstrate that a satisfactory non-algorithmic explanation 
can be provided for the proof rules, notwithstanding the failures of the efforts at 
sophisticated theoretical explanations. 
A. Formalities: Juridical Proof and Conventional Probability Theory 
Both Levmore and Stein assume that it is appropriate to interpret the preponderance 
standard as adopting a conventional probability measure of greater than a .5 probability – 
that, in other words, it is appropriate to model the plaintiff’s burden as having to establish 
that the probability of each element exceeds .5.  Neither explains what that might mean, 
and none of the possible meanings capture the phenomenon supposedly being modeled.  
Implicit in both presentations is that it is sensible to model trials as establishing elements 
or their negation, and that doing so exhausts the range of possibilities.  As we show, this 
is not accurate or plausible.139 
The meaning of a phrase such as “prove elements to a greater than .5 probability” is 
not self-evident.  There are four standard interpretations: it can refer to a measure of 
                                                     
139 Prof. Stein is fully aware of the difficulties in providing useful interpretations of “probability” in the 
present context, which confirms that the goal in his article lay more in economic modeling than empirical 
adequacy.  See ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 44-56 (2001). 
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relative frequency, logical probability, subjective probability,140 or a propensity.141  
Relative frequency is a measure of the occurrence of a subset of events within a set of 
events – for example, how often did a coin come up heads when flipped a certain number 
of times?  Logical probability involves a priori assessments of the probability of an event 
occurring, rather than a measurement of how frequently one outcome actually occurred in 
a repeated series of events.  Subjective probability involves maintaining consistency 
among subjective states of belief.  Propensity theories describe truly random events. 
None of these describe juridical proof. 
Logical probability can be disposed of immediately.  Trials do not involve a priori 
speculation about the logical relationships between events and the ways in which they 
may interact.  Litigation obviously does not involve problems that are analogous to an a 
priori assessment of how probable any particular result of a throw of a die is, which is the 
paradigmatic example of logical probability.  Trials are based on evidence of events that 
have already occurred. 
Do they, then, look like a measure of relative frequency, which does involve ex post 
assessments of the relative frequency of different sets of events?  Obviously not, at least 
as a general matter.142  Rarely is relative frequency data provided at trial, and rarely are 
repeated trials of events conducted to observe the outcomes.  Notwithstanding the 
modern fervor over expert testimony, evidence in statistical form is relatively 
                                                     
140 See generally T. L. FINE, THEORIES OF PROBABILITY (Academic Press 1973), at chs. IV (Relative 
Frequency), VII (Logical Probability), VIII (Subjective Probability; DONALD GILLIES, PHILOSOPHICAL 
THEORIES OF PROBABILITY (2000). 
141 See D. MELLOR, THE MATTER OF CHANCE (1971); K. P. Popper, The Propensity Interpretation of 
Probability, 10 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 25 (1959). 
142 Obviously, trials may involve statistical evidence, and some trials may turn on it.  We are making claims 
about the general phenomenon, however. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art17
45 
infrequently provided; and, even when it is offered, it is virtually never offered on an 
element itself, which is the critical question.  There may be relative frequency evidence 
that, along with other evidence, may permit an inference of an element, but virtually 
never is there any data of the relative frequency of the element itself, given all the 
evidence.  Nor do fact finders bring such knowledge with them to the trial.  Individuals 
certainly operate with many heuristics and beliefs that are a kind of summary of their 
experiences, but these do not tend to be in the form of relative frequencies.143  There is, in 
short, virtually nothing at trial that looks comparable to testing whether a coin is evenly 
balanced by flipping it a large number of times and observing the outcomes, or whether a 
logical prediction about the outcome of the roll of a die will be vindicated in practice. 
Interestingly, if either of these critiques of logical and relative frequency 
interpretations of probability as applied to trials is wrong, then all the consternation over 
the conjunction paradox has the problem exactly backwards.  The concern of the 
conjunction paradox is that the plaintiff will win in the face of a high probability that he 
or she deserves to lose.  In fact, if the plaintiff must establish that the probability of each 
element exceeds .5 on either a logical possibility or relative frequency interpretation of 
probability, plaintiffs could rarely win their cases, and thus their burden is too high rather 
than too low. 
Take logical probability first.  To specify the logical relationships among events 
requires an exhaustive listing of all the ways the events could be – for example, how 
many faces are on a die, how are they configured, how is the die weighted, are any of the 
                                                     
143 Knowledge about life tends to be embedded in stories and scripts, as we return to, infra.  This isn’t to 
say that there is no other kind of knowledge, or that, if there is, it is never relevant to trials.  We are dealing 
with the standard case. 
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faces magnetized, and so on.  A plaintiff would have to specify all the ways the world 
could be with respect to each element, and demonstrate that the sum of the probabilities 
of the way that the world could be favoring liability exceeds .5.  We are not even sure this 
task is comprehensible; but if it is, it is not achievable.  There are virtually an infinite 
number of ways the world might be, and no plaintiff has the resources or knowledge to 
specify them, let alone logically appraise their probabilities.144 
A relative frequency interpretation suffers in a sense from the opposite problem.  
Proving a relative frequency requires the plaintiff to show all the ways in which the world 
could have been with respect to the elements, and that half of those ways plus one favor 
liability.145  This, again, is a nearly impossible task that virtually no plaintiff will ever be 
able to accomplish.146 
The arguments of Levmore and Stein neglect that to establish either a logical 
probability or a relative frequency requires knowing what the negation of an element 
                                                     
144 What makes logical probability operate is an a priori belief about the probability of events.  In cases 
apparently involving stochastic independence, this reduces to a belief of equal probability of the events, 
such as the equal probability of any face of an evenly balanced die coming up on a throw.  It is not at all 
obvious how this would be applied in the real world of complex events, where an assumption of equal 
probability hardly seems warranted. 
145 Actually, a standard relative frequency account would require that the relevant event be repeated a large 
number of times, with the outcomes observed, like flipping a coin or rolling a die.  Again, what this might 
mean in the real world of litigation is at best obscure.  We try to give a plausible interpretation of it in the 
text. 
146 If either task could be done (showing the ways the world might be or might have been), Alvin I. 
Goldman, Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence, 42 JURIMETRICS 237 (2002), argues that a 
truth conducive “quasi-Bayesian” theory of proof can be constructed.  The trouble is that neither task can 
be accomplished.  Moreover, it would have to be accomplished over every piece of evidence introduced, 
whatever that might mean.  On the ambiguity of the concept of juridical evidence, see Ronald J. Allen, 
Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 604 (1994).  Goldman is sensitive to these 
difficulties, but neglects that the critical question for a theory of inference is not whether it can explain a 
single evidentiary proffer under unrealistic conditions, but all or much of the evidentiary proffers under 
realistic conditions. See Goldman, supra, at 249-52.  All of the conventional interpretations of probability 
can be used to explain single proffers under unrealistic conditions. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art17
47 
entails, and both assume that it is appropriate to model a decision as X or not-X.147  It is 
not appropriate to model the decision of most legal elements in this fashion.  To make 
this concrete, suppose “heads” is conceived of as the “element” of a cause of action and 
consider how a calculation of either the logical probability or the relative frequency of a 
series of coin flips would occur.  With respect to logical probability, the possibilities are, 
in a sense, heads or not heads, but “not heads” is precisely defined.  It can only be tails or 
landing on an edge.  The same is true with respect to a relative frequency, and simple 
tests can be done.  At trial, by contrast, the negation of an element will typically be a 
large and unruly set of possibilities.  Take causation as an example.  For the plaintiff to 
prove that “causation” by the defendant is more likely than “no causation” would require 
the plaintiff to specify, and disprove, all the ways in which someone other than the 
defendant might have caused the result.  Without such knowledge, evidence of what the 
defendant did is essentially meaningless.  Even the most damning evidence can be 
explained; and without all possible explanations provided and considered,148 no 
meaningful assessment of the conventional “probability” of causation or no causation can 
be provided.  And so on.149 
                                                     
147 While he does not discuss these points in his economic argument, Prof. Stein is fully aware of these 
matters, which further suggests his interests were in economic modeling rather than accurate description. 
See, e.g., Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J. L. & JUR. 279 (1996); PORAT & STEIN, 
supra note 139, at ch. I, pt. E, Two Interpretations of the Civil Standard of Proof, and n.81. 
148 Suppose DNA indicates a person is the father of the child.  What if he is one of quintuplets? 
149 Interestingly, the implications of the formal analysis of the conjunction paradox and those of giving a 
standard probability interpretation to the phrase “proof by a preponderance” have offsetting consequences.  
The former results in the plaintiff’s burden being too low, while the latter results in it being too high.  
Maybe the combined effect is that it is just right.  This sounds, of course, like the kind of argument that we 
criticized Levmore for making.  Our only defense is that we are not employing it as an ad hoc move to save 
a formal theory from its own implications, but instead merely identifying it as one of many pragmatic 
factors that may be operating to eliminate the perverse effect of the formal conjunction paradox standing 
alone.  We also do not make much of the point ourselves.  We think the real explanation as to why the 
conjunction paradox is not perverse lies in the reality of juridical proof, as we explore in the remainder of 
this section. 
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It is, in part, for reasons such as these that theorizing about evidence and trials has 
explored subjective Bayesian conceptions of proof at trial.150  Subjective Bayesianism 
refers to a rigorous manner of keeping one’s beliefs consistent.  If a person begins with a 
consistent belief set, under certain assumptions one can update the belief set in an orderly 
fashion in light of new evidence.  The attraction of such a theory for the field of evidence 
is apparent; trials certainly can be modeled as a rational updating of prior beliefs in light 
of new evidence.  Nonetheless, this formalization of probability also cannot explain 
juridical proof. 
First, if the decision being made is designed to reflect something about the real world, 
subjective Bayesian approaches have all the previous constraints of other forms of 
conventional probability.  For a person to form a rational assessment of the probability of 
some element, all the alternatives must be considered, and so we are back precisely where 
we were with respect to logical probability and relative frequencies.  If this point is 
neglected, and a fact finder is told to form an assessment of some element without 
adequate context, there is literally no reason to think that such an assessment would have 
any particular relationship to reality.  This leads to the second problem with Bayesian 
approaches – they quickly lead to radical subjectivity.151  Even a well motivated decision 
maker trying to determine accurately the facts almost never has reliable information 
about discrete pieces of evidence that can be translated into likelihood ratios that can be 
used within Bayes’ Theorem to produce reliable outputs.  Moreover, jurors do not reason 
naturally through the formal application of Bayes’ Theorem, and asking them to do so is 
                                                     
150 See, e.g., INT’L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF, Special Issue: Bayesianism & Juridical Proof, (Ronald J. Allen 
& Mike Redmayne eds., 1997) [hereinafter Special Issue]. 
151 Goldman, supra note 146, at 239 (“It is not at all clear how purely subjective Bayesian methods, applied 
to the legal context, hold any promise of leading a trier of fact to truth.”). 
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likely to lead to unpredictable results.152  Radical subjectivity and unpredictability in turn 
are inconsistent with all theories of trials having factual accuracy as a primary goal, 
which essentially means all acceptable theories of trials.  And if factual accuracy is not an 
issue, the conjunction paradox would disappear as a matter of concern. 
There are other limitations to Bayesian approaches, as well.  In particular, the process 
at trial is directly inconsistent with Bayesian requirements.  This has been thoroughly 
demonstrated in the literature,153 and we will give only a few brief examples here.  For 
Bayesian updating to occur, at a minimum, all the hypotheses of interest must be 
articulated, and then they may be updated in light of new evidence.154  Neither occurs at 
                                                     
152 This is why careful commentators invoke Bayes’ Theorem as part of an “idealized theory of forensic 
proof” and perceive the need “to attempt to formulate a philosophically adequate account of the 
interpersonal and logical standards that promote accurate estimation” of the facts upon which a verdict 
should rest. David H. Kaye, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand Proof Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt?, 66 B.U.L. REV. 657, 671 (1986).  A project to which our article is quite sympathetic. 
153 See, e.g., Grand Illusion, supra note 5, at 43-44; Special Issue, supra note 150, at Ronald J. Allen, 
Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary Inquiry 254, 263-71 [hereinafter A Preliminary 
Inquiry]. 
154 These are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the operation of subjective Bayesianism.  For 
subjective belief states to be computable, a formalization of subjective probability is required – the most 
well known of these formalizations was created by Leonard J. Savage. See generally LEONARD J. SAVAGE, 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (2d ed. rev. 1972).  Savage’s assumptions do not map onto trials. See 
Allen, A Preliminary Inquiry, supra note 153, at 260-70.  A number of commentators within the field of 
evidence rely on subjective probability, but fail to attend to the assumptions necessary for Bayesian 
subjectivism to operate algorithmically.  For example, Richard Friedman has asserted that “the only 
constraints that Bayesianism puts on the probabilities that an observer may assign to a set of propositions 
are that they be in the range from zero to one and that they meet conditions of consistency with each other.” 
Friedman, supra note 17, at 2042.  To our knowledge, this description does not accurately identify the 
requirements of any formalization of subjective probability.  It is directly inconsistent with Savage’s, which 
includes among other constraints the sure thing principle. See SAVAGE, supra, at 21-26.  To our knowledge, 
no proponent of Bayesian approaches to legal evidence has ever examined the necessary assumptions for 
subjective probabilities to be computable, although this has been called to their attention. A Preliminary 
Inquiry, supra note 153.  This is another example of the curious phenomenon of the ad hoc use of formal 
arguments, of appearing to rely on the formal argument by being indifferent to its foundation.  This may 
have some value as a heuristic, see, for example, Special Issue, supra note 150, at Richard O. Lempert, Of 
Flutes, Oboes and the As If World of Evidence Law 316, but the value of such a loose use of theoretical 
constructs for advancing knowledge is doubtful.  
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trial.155  The hypotheses of interest are typically not articulated until closing argument, 
and jurors are told not to form conclusions on the evidence until all the evidence is in.  
By the time all the theories are unveiled and all the evidence heard, there is no longer any 
updating to occur.  Probability assessments might still be made at that point, but that has 
nothing to do with Bayes Theorem. 
Propensity theories of probability fare no better.  They were developed originally as a 
means of conceptualizing the implications of the truly stochastic processes of quantum 
mechanics, and as Alvin Goldman has trenchantly pointed out, “events involved in the 
legal domain are not governed by stochastic laws of the sort found in quantum 
mechanics.”156  Various attempts have been made to provide versions of the propensity 
interpretation of probability that permit objective probability statements to be made about 
singular events outside the domain of quantum mechanics, but they invariably reduce to 
frequentist accounts with the problems previous identified, or make a series of ad hoc 
moves that make their application to legal affairs exceedingly problematic.157 
In sum, conceptualizing the proof process at trial as proving elements or their 
negation has no plausible, truth conducive, operationalization in the standard conceptions 
of probability.  There is no plausible interpretation within conventional probability that 
can be given to the idea that plaintiffs must prove each of the elements to a greater than .5 
probability that is likely to increase accuracy of adjudication.  If any of the standard 
interpretations of probability is applied to the preponderance rule, the implications of the 
                                                     
155 This is a different point from the previous one in the text.  There the question is the relationship between 
subjective beliefs and the real world.  Here the question is the relationship between trial practice and the 
minimal requirements of Bayes’ Theorem. 
156 Goldman, supra note 146, at 246. 
157 For an excellent discussion, see Mike Redmayne, Objective Probabilities and the Assessment of 
Evidence (manuscript in the possession of authors). 
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conjunction paradox are precisely the opposite of those that concern Levmore and Stein.  
That the actual implication of the concerns expressed by such astute observers as these 
two is exactly the opposite of what they assert should alert us that something is amiss.  
And it is.  What is amiss is that trials are not structured to litigate the probability of 
elements and their negations; they are structured to permit choices over the hypotheses 
advanced by the parties, as we now turn to. 
B. Functionalism: Juridical Proof and the Relative Plausibility Theory 
Most discussions of the proof paradoxes isolate the burden of proof instructions from 
all other trial related activity.  This is a mistake.  When trials, including pretrial 
processes, are viewed as a whole, a much different picture emerges of the nature of 
juridical proof; that picture involves the parties asserting a limited number of the ways in 
which the universe might have been on the litigated day in question, and the fact finder 
focusing at least initially on those competing hypotheses.  So viewing the proof process, 
in addition to being descriptively more accurate, eliminates the formal problems of proof 
captured by the conjunction paradox. 
Consider, first, pre-trial proceedings.  Although pleading practice is often fairly 
uninformative of the parties’ contentions, discovery fills in many of the gaps, and 
discovery is a two-way street.  Not only do plaintiffs have to divulge their factual and 
legal theories through discovery, so, too, do defendants.  By the time trial occurs, the 
standard context involves a reasonably sharp disagreement over two stories of what 
occurred, and their legal implications.158  Thus, parties discard much of the possible 
ambiguity surrounding events and choose to litigate only a part of it.  To be sure, subject 
                                                     
158 Pre-trial orders continue the winnowing process. 
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to judicial control of the proceedings, a plaintiff or defendant does not have to identify a 
single factual or legal theory, but the failure to do so has pragmatic consequences, thus 
encouraging parties to do so.  The parties ought to know what they think happened, and 
the failure to identify a clear alternative to the opposition may be taken by fact finders as 
indicating that the opposition’s story is probably true.159  The formalities of trial practice 
and the pragmatics of natural reasoning processes thus converge to reduce the dispute at 
trial to the choice over alternative competing stories.160 
Now consider the trial stories themselves.  Typically, these will be stories of real 
events happening in the real world.  That in turn means they will typically be integrated 
stories in which the parts are highly dependent.  Dependence alone does not eliminate the 
conjunction paradox, but it has a related attribute.  If trials involve integrated events, and 
if one “element” is unlikely, then so, too, is the story of which it is a necessary part.  If 
“preponderance of the evidence” means something like “do you believe the elements are 
true,” and the answer to one of them is “no,” that is a very good reason to doubt that the 
story in which it is embedded is true.  Indeed, the integrated stories litigated at trial are 
typically highly similar, varying in only a few factual respects.161  Consider a contract 
case, for example.  Typically, the parties’ claims about most contract formation and 
execution will be identical, even if there is a claim about breach or nonperformance.  By 
requiring both parties to articulate their factual assertions, a trial is usually reduced to a 
                                                     
159 We return below to what the word “probably” means in this sentence. 
160 For a collection of cases adopting the relative plausibility approach, see Allen & Leiter, supra note 116, 
at 1532-34.  For another recent recognition of its utility, see In re Blech Securities Regulation, 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 4650, at *55 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2003) (“In this case, the jury can best form a judgment 
when presented with the two experts’ competing theories.”). 
161 See transcripts in RONALD J. ALLEN, RICHARD B. KAHNS & ELANOR SWIFT, EVIDENCE: TEXT, 
PROBLEMS, AND CASES 1-89 (3rd ed. 2002) and RICHARD O. LEMPERT, SAMUEL R. GROSS, JAMES S. 
LIEBMAN, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 13-26 (West 2000).  This is also consistent with the 
prediction of the Priest-Klein theory discussed supra. 
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real dispute over a very small number of facts, and perhaps only one.  Levmore was right 
to suggest that this might be the case, although for a different reason than he identified.  It 
is not that many trials involve only one formal element; it is that the stories told by the 
parties will often be highly similar, differing in only a few salient factual respects. 
However, disputes over a single fact can constitute disputes over every formal element.  
An example is a case of slander where the defense disputes that the words were spoken.  
Even if they were spoken, they may not be demeaning, even if they are, there may be no 
damages, and so on.162  
It is these and similar points that led to the emergence of the relative plausibility 
theory163 of juridical proof.  The critical points are that litigation involves the choice by 
the fact finder over the stories advanced by the parties (or of a story constructed in light 
of the parties), and that proof is largely comparative or ordinal rather than cardinal, as 
entailed by conventional probabilistic accounts.164  For reasons noted above and others, 
this approach does not suffer from the formal problems that afflict conventional 
probability accounts, and it more accurately describes the pre-trial and trial processes.  
Indeed, it explains a range of trial related phenomena, such as various rules of evidence, 
that the conventional probabilistic approaches do not explain as well (at all, actually).165  
Moreover, the relative plausibility structure of the civil litigation system may very well 
advance the primary goal of accurate adjudication.  The parties know their dispute best, 
                                                     
162 See Porat & Stein, supra note 139, at 52, n.83. 
163 It is a “theory” of a different kind, however.  It is not algorithmic or formal in any fashion. 
164 The possibility of fact finder creativity in determining what happened is not a problem for the relative 
plausibility theory, as what matters is story formation. 
165 See Juridical Proof, supra note 6, at 413-20.  Moreover, many rules of evidence appear in tension with a 
conventional probabilistic approach.  For example, propensity evidence is disfavored by the rules – see, for 
example, FED. R. EVID. 404(b) – whereas it is compatible with probabilistic approaches.  Similarly, courts 
are cautious in admitting prior happenings evidence, although no rule formally requires its exclusion.  For a 
discussion, see ALLEN, KUHNS & SWIFT, supra note 161, at 377-84. 
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what is critical and what peripheral, what likely will and will not be enlightening, and so 
on.  They also know that an adversary stands ready to point out any shortcomings and 
difficulties in their story, which will be done in part through rhetoric but most 
importantly through evidence of the facts constituting their competing stories.  By 
focusing attention on the relationship between claims and evidence in a conventional 
manner, as judged by fact finders astute in human affairs, it is at least reasonable to think 
that errors may be kept to a minimum. 
The relative plausibility theory can be criticized on various grounds.  Most 
importantly, it denies that the burden of persuasion instructions can be taken literally as 
requiring judgments based on the serial determination of elements.  It does not, however, 
rest on the mistaken view that the burden of persuasion focuses on the conjunction 
instead.  It is not the conjunction of elements that determines outcomes; it is whether the 
plaintiff’s story is more plausible than the defendant’s.  This does discount the 
significance of the burden of persuasion instructions, and is a weakness in the theory (it 
would be better to explain everything).  However, by discounting that one part of the 
proof process, virtually all the rest can be explained.  Unlike the arguments of Levmore 
and Stein, the virtue of the relative plausibility theory does not depend on a series of ad 
hoc moves in the context of what purport to be formal arguments.  Part of its virtue lies in 
demonstrating how the persuasion rule is simply the odd man out, as it were, and that it 
does not easily coexist within the web of rules and practices that surround it. 
The relative plausibility theory has other virtues as well.  There is a substantial 
amount of data on how lawyers litigate and jurors decide cases.  Lawyers present 
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coherent, integrated stories,166 and jurors construct integrated stories of what happened, 
and then map the story onto the verdict possibilities.167  How either process is consistent 
with the portrayal of litigation that emerges from Levmore’s and Stein’s approach is not 
clear.  What occurs at trial is perfectly consistent with the relative plausibility theory. 
Two other points deserve attention.  As Levmore’s article points out, litigation can 
involve multiple stories or multiple legal theories (Levmore discusses only the latter).  
Multiple stories are not a difficulty for the relative plausibility theory, as it easily extends 
to a comparison of the plausibility of various litigated ways the world might have been 
that favor the various parties.  The ultimate extension of this might be a specification of 
all the ways the world might have been on the day in question, which begins to 
approximate the logical probability and relative frequency approaches criticized above.  
The critical difference is that those approaches require such a specification, whereas the 
relative plausibility theory merely permits it if the parties so choose, and of course they 
never do.  This is, thus, only a logical, not a real objection to the theory. 
Multiple legal theories present a different question from multiple stories concerning 
the same legal theory.  With multiple stories, the posture of plaintiffs and defendants is 
symmetric: Whichever story or collection of stories is most plausible should win.  This is 
not true with regard to multiple legal theories (at least those involving differing facts).  
Consider a case involving three different legal theories and three different factual 
foundations.  Plaintiffs deserve to win if one of the stories embodying one legal theory is 
                                                     
166 See W. LANCE BENNET & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: 
JUSTICE AND JUDGEMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981). 
167 See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991); see also Jill E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo, Sexual Harassment Stories: 
Testing a Study-Mediated Model of Juror Decision-Making in Civil Litigation, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 29 
(2003) (reports empirical work on the story model).  
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true; defendants deserve to win only if all of their competing stories are true (for if this if 
false, one of the plaintiff’s stories is true).  For example, assume the plaintiff has alleged 
defective design, defective manufacture, and failure to warn theories.  If the probability 
of each is .25, the “probability” of each not being true is .75.  But, the probability of at 
least one being true is 1 - .753 = .58, and perhaps plaintiff should win, even though the 
individual probabilities of each being false is .75. 
Levmore’s amelioration of this problem is, as before, to assert that the probability of a 
cause of action equaling .25 really means something else, and thus things may work out 
acceptably.168  Our solution is quite different; it is that the problem has no real world 
specification.169  The information necessary for it to be a problem will virtually never 
exist, and thus it will never arise.  Again, no plausible meaning within conventional 
probability applicable to the legal setting can be given to the concept “the probability of a 
design defect is X.”  What will arise is a story about defective design and a story about 
                                                     
168 Levmore, supra note 10, at 745-56. 
169 The problems generated by attempting to take seriously such an unworldly hypothetical are well 
presented by the attempt of Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidence for 
Adverse Decisions, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (1996), to analyze the implications of three or more 
“independent” charges of sexual harassment. Id. at 41-43.  Their concern is decisions outside of litigation, 
such as dismissal of a teacher, but the strained nature of the analysis is invariant over the setting.  If three 
claims of sexual harassment against a teacher are made, any competent decision maker would want to 
investigate what factors generated the complaints and their actual ontological status.  Are they really 
independent or part of a campaign against a particular teacher?  Why are there three apparently independent 
claims with exactly the same probability?  Doesn’t that suggest they are probably not independent?  How 
often are claims made against teachers?  Is it a fluke that three claims have been lodged against this one, 
and if so, is it because so many or so few have been lodged?  And so on.  Human decision makers will not 
happily accept this stylized hypothetical as an adequate ground for decision, and, even if more information 
is not forthcoming, that factor itself will be viewed as containing information.  Moreover, when the setting 
is shifted to the litigation arena, another problem becomes obvious.  Suppose three such civil complaints so 
that the probability of one being true exceeds .5.  Which one?  Who gets the award?  This also applies to 
three separate causes of action based on the same facts, as recovery will be cause of action dependent.  To 
be sure, this kind of statistical approach can be viewed as analyzing the limiting case of evidence and 
procedure, but its primary import is to demonstrate another reason why the system of litigation forces cases 
away from this quasi-statistical mode into that of plausible human stories.  The significance of human 
stories in criminal litigation has been noted explicitly by the Supreme Court in Old Chief v. United States, 
519 U.S. 172 (1997) (“a syllogism is not a story”). 
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appropriate design, a story about defective manufacturing and a story about appropriate 
manufacturing, a story about failure to warn and a story about no duty to warn, and so on.  
Liability will depend on which of each dichotomy is thought to be more plausible.  This 
has a mild effect of somewhat approximating the “proper” statistical outcome: Plaintiff 
will win if any of the three stories embodying the three legal theories is more plausible 
than its counterpart offered by the defendant, although it differs in that the fact finder 
would need to specify which one.  In any event, the critical difference is that, within the 
relative plausibility theory, it is unnecessary to put this dynamic into conventional 
probabilistic terms, and thus an impossible condition is excused rather than required.170 
Professor Richard Friedman has raised another objection to the relative plausibility 
theory, suggesting that perhaps the theory cannot handle intermediate burdens of 
persuasion such as clear and convincing evidence.171  He implies that the explanation 
given of clear and convincing evidence that it “is simply a considerably more persuasive 
story than its opposition,” can only be understood by collapsing it into conventional 
probability, and giving it a meaning of requiring proof of elements to exceed some higher 
number than normal, .75 perhaps.  This criticism seems to be motivated by the belief that 
ordinal mathematics cannot accommodate any measures of relative rank other than 
                                                     
170 Another advantage is that it maps onto the way humans actually reason.  If a person is annoyed with 
another for three separate reasons, and receives three separate convincing responses, one does not remain 
annoyed because the probability of one of the three, (even though one does not know which one), exceeds 
some probability threshold.  Rather, one deals with things serially.  Perhaps the statistician would say we 
are wrong to do so, but then the question would be whether the law should defer to the statistician or the 
great majority of mankind.  We cheerily concede that, were the world different and accurate statistical 
accounts could be given of these various phenomena, the analysis would differ accordingly, but “it is also 
true that if my nephew Andy had wheels and a six-cylinder engine, he might function as a Pontiac 
Firebird.” Craig R. Callen, A Brief Word on the Statistical Debate, 66 TULANE L. REV. 1405, 1409 (1992). 
True enough, but its implications for the world we inhabit are opaque at best. 
171 Friedman, supra note 17, at 2047.  The relative plausibility theory gives a good account of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt. See Juridical Proof, supra note 6, at 382-84. 
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“greater than” – that ordinal mathematics cannot accommodate, for example, “much 
greater than.” 
There are two responses to this criticism.  First, which in a sense captures precisely 
the significance of this article, we are trying to explain the relationship between natural 
reasoning and trial processes, not mathematics.  Even if there is a conflict between the 
universal intuition that “much greater than” makes sense in comparative terms and 
mathematics unless the concept is reduced to cardinality, Friedman’s criticism privileges 
for no good reason mathematics over natural reasoning processes.  Even if there is a 
conflict between ordinal mathematics and natural reasoning, why assume that the 
problem lies in the state of human intuition rather than in the developmental state of 
ordinal mathematics?  More importantly, there is a well developed mathematics of 
ordinal numbers,172 and it includes ways to capture the concept that A is much bigger 
than B,173 although we see no great significance to the point. 
                                                     
172 See, e.g., Grzegorz Bancerek, Ordinal Arithmetics, 2 J. FORMALIZED MATHEMATICS 515 (1990). 
173 In particular, the cofinality of A is greater than B if no sequence of ordinals less than A which is indexed 
by B has A as its limit.  Informally, the idea is that one cannot get up to A in B many jumps, no matter how 
big the jumps are.  For discussions, see JUDITH ROITMAN, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN SET THEORY 90-92 
(WILEY 1990) and HERBERT B. ENDERTON, ELEMENTS OF SET THEORY 257-62 (Academic Press 1997).  As 
should be clear, we are not claiming that this concept maps directly onto the “clear and convincing” 
standard; rather, we are only pointing out that there is no reason to think that the intuition that the concept 
“much greater than” is coherent is mistaken.  There are other mathematical efforts to deal with qualitative 
assessments of probability.  A qualitative probability is essentially a listing of all of the subsets of a set in 
order of likelihood.  A set “A” can be thought of as much more likely than “B” if there are a large number 
of sets that sit between them on the list.  Moreover, suppose that there is a qualitative probability known to 
arise from some probability measure.  Under certain conditions, various things can be known of it; for 
example, that it is twice as probable as some other probability measure, even though neither probability 
measure is known.  For a discussion, see Peter C. Fishburn, Finite Linear Qualitative Probability, 40 J. OF 
MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOL. 64 (1996).  We are indebted to Jeff Hirst of Appalachian State University and 
Paul Edelman of Vanderbilt University for their assistance on the mathematics of ordinality. 
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The relative plausibility theory thus eliminates the conjunction problem by avoiding it 
entirely, and explains most of what actually occurs at trial and in discovery.174  It has the 
added virtue of generating readily testable hypotheses about the behavior and decision 
making of trial participants, unlike the formal theories of Levmore and Stein, which 
would be difficult if not impossible to test.  By itself, this certainly does not increase the 
probability of its being true, but it is at least somewhat comforting that a theory 
propounded about the real world does not have to be taken almost exclusively on faith. 
The most serious criticism of the relative plausibility theorem is that “plausibility” is 
not well defined.  Two points need to be made here.  First, we are trying to explain 
human decision making in litigation, and from that perspective there is no a priori reason 
why any particular concept needs to be well defined in a logical sense.  To make such a 
demand is to make precisely the mistake that the algorithmic efforts to explain the burden 
of persuasion make; it begs the question whether such an approach is appropriate.  The 
more telling question is whether the concept of plausibility has a real world analogue, and 
the answer to that is plainly yes.  Everyone reading these sentences has full confidence in 
their general capacity to make judgments of the relative plausibility of different 
scenarios; everyone does it all the time.  Moreover the relative plausibility theory easily 
maps onto the work of the cognitive scientists who are attempting to uncover how 
                                                     
174 Interestingly, special verdicts may be at odds with the relative plausibility story, but they also may be at 
odds with how humans reason about litigated events, which may explain why they are only infrequently 
used notwithstanding calls by commentators for their increased use.  For an interesting examination of the 
implications of special verdicts, see David A. Lombardero, Do Special Verdicts Improve the Structure of 
Jury Decision-Making?, 36 JURIMETRICS 275 (1996).  Lombardero examines the potential consequences 
and logical effects of special verdicts.  However, the article does not address how jurors actually instructed 
on special verdicts administer them.  It may be the case that jurors still form stories and then map the 
stories onto the verdict choices.  Indeed, in one sense, all special verdicts do is require the jury to convey to 
the judge the decision making process it goes through under the story model.  The point, of course, is that 
special verdicts pose empirical questions rather than purely analytical ones. 
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humans actually make decisions through such considerations as completeness, coherence, 
consistency, and coverage.175 
But there is a second response, one that in a fashion closes the circle of our argument.  
“Relative plausibility” can be interpreted in a multitude of ways, at least heuristically.  It 
can bear at least informally a relative frequency interpretation, where the task of the jury 
would be understood as attempting to get correct results in the long run.  Of course, no 
such data will ever exist to test the outcomes, which is why we label these interpretations 
“heuristics.”  It can be given a Bayesian interpretation to the effect that jurors should 
decide in favor of that party that the juror believes has better established its case, or an 
inductivist interpretation grading the level of inductive support.  It can be given a 
hypothesis testing interpretation that the task is to determine the probability of the 
evidence, given a particular hypothesis, or a parallel distributing process interpretation,176 
and so on.  Nonetheless, all of these interpretations would be parasitic on an obvious and 
well known human practice, could not be truly formalized, and in any event there is no 
reason to believe that the accuracy of trial outcomes would be advanced by attempting to 
shoehorn what humans actually do into one of these, or any other similar, explanations or 
protocols.  Each of these formal processes captures an aspect of reason, but none of them 
captures it entirely.  The relatively primitive notion of deciding the relative plausibility of 
human affairs, by contrast, captures precisely what humans do, and for which there is 
substantial evidence to believe they do it well. 
 
 
                                                     
175 See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 167. 
176 See, e.g., PAUL THAGARD, CONCEPTUAL REVOLUTIONS (1992). 
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VI. ALGORITHMS AND EXPLANATIONS 
Much like Prof. Nance suggested, we suspect that the historical explanation for the 
conventional treatment of the preponderance standard resulted from the impulse to 
emphasize that all necessary parts of a plaintiff’s story must be supported by adequate 
evidence.  Standing alone, though, that admonition is quite uninformative of what a 
showing satisfactory for a verdict might amount to.  As we have tried to show, the answer 
to that question has not been provided by the sophisticated theoretical accounts given of 
the preponderance standard, but an answer may emerge from an understanding of the 
nature of litigation in which the preponderance standard is embedded.  This does not 
mean that no such theoretical account could be given – after all, no matter how many 
white swans one sees, the next one might be black – but we doubt that one can be 
constructed.  Still, after three hundred and fifty years, Fermat’s conjecture was proven,177 
and perhaps something similar will occur with the conjunction paradox.  What makes us 
doubtful is that Fermat’s conjecture was about a formal system; the so-called conjunction 
paradox has its referent in real life. While some aspects of real life may be explainable in 




                                                     
177 See BARRY CIPRA, WHAT’S HAPPENING IN THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES 1995-1996 at 2-14 (Paul Zorn 
ed., 1996) (discussing the resolution of “the most famous problem in mathematics”).  
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